You have three tickets to a Celtics game on a night that you are going to be out of town (so the value of unsold tickets is zero to you). There are only four possible buyers of a Celtics ticket. The table below lists the respective reservation prices of these four possible buyers: Customer                     Reservation Price 1                                  $25 2                                  $35 3                                  $50 4                                  $60 You consider inviting bids using an English auction to sell your tickets. How much total revenue can you generate using the English auction mechanism from the sale of the three tickets? [Bids can be made in increments of $1.00]

A monopoly produces a good with a network externality at a constant marginal and average cost of c = $2. In the first period, its inverse demand curve is p 14-1Q. In the second period, its inverse demand curve is p=14-1Q unless it sells at least Q = 8 units in the first period. If it meets or exceeds this target, then the demand curve rotates out by a (it sells a times as many units for any given price), so that its inverse demand curve is p=14- - 1/10. The monopoly knows that it can sell no output after the second period. The monopoly's objective is to maximize the sum of its profits over the two periods. For what values of a would the monopoly earn a higher two-period profit by setting a lower price in the first period? . (round your answer to two decimal places) If a is

N: $30 V: $130 High price New firm N: $50 V: $100 Low price Advertise Verizon N: $60 V: $140 Do not advertise Expand High price New New firm firm Low price N: $70 V: $90 Do not N: $30 V: $170 The figure shown displays the choices that could be made by Verizon and a new firm in the industry. The payoffs are the profits (in millions) these companies will earn as a result of their choices. What will be the outcome of this game? Multiple Choice The new firm will expand; Verizon will advertise; the new firm will choose high prices. The new firm will expand; Verizon will advertise; the new firm will choose low prices. The new firm will expand; Verizon will not advertise; the new firm will choose high prices. The new firm will not expand. еxpand

What is Revenue Equivalence Theorem for the standard auction types?

Refer to the following payoff table: Firm A's Advertising Budget Low Multiple Choice Medium High A D G $900, $900 Low $1,000, $800 Firm A High; Firm B Low Firm A Low; Firm B Low Firm B's Advertising Budget Medium B E H $820, $1,220 $950, $1,025 с F 1 High $875, $920 $800, $875 $1,025, $1,175 Using the method of successive elimination of dominated strategies, which strategies, if any, are eliminated after the first round? $1,060, $1,100 $1,040, $1,000

What are the Benefits (advantages) and Limitations ( disadvantages) of Arbitrage Pricing Theory model

Problem # 4 Idea Inc. is a small publishing company operating in the college and textbook market, which is one of the most profitable segments for book publishers. Idea Inc. has a cost of producing, handling, and shipping of about $30 for each additional book. The publisher’s overall marketing and promotion spending (set annually) accounts for an average cost of about $10 per book. Idea Inc.’s best-selling game theory text has a demand curve: P = 200 - Q, where Q denotes yearly sales (in thousands) of books. For this text Idea Inc. pays a $10 per book royalty to the author. a) Determine the profit-maximizing output and price for the game theory text. b) A rival publisher has raised the price of its best-selling game theory text by $20. One option is to exactly match this price hike and so exactly preserve your level of sales. Do you endorse this price increase? (Explain briefly why or why not.) c) To save significantly on fixed costs, Idea Inc. plans to contract out the actual printing…

Explain how an auction to sell a consumer-facing banking division might be used to determine the value of the division.

please  if you can teach explain

You suspect that you are a price leader in the market. Moreover, you are considering expanding your operations. H.R. Shovenstuff will observe your moves and then follow, but he is more secretive so you will not know whether to price high or low after his pricing decision has been made. Using the following game tree, solve for the Nash equilibrium. High Price Shovenstuff High Price Low Price You High Price (2,1) (6,2) Invest Low Price Invest, High Price, High Price O Invest, Low Price, High Price Invest, Low Price, Low Price O Don't Invest, High Price, High Price Don't Invest, Low Price, High Price LOW Price (2,4) You High Price (4,4) Don't Invest High Price Low Price Shovenstuff Low Price You High Price (8,1) (2.6) Low Price (2,1)