You are the manager of Taurus Technologies, and your sole competitor is Spyder Technologies. The two firms' products are viewed as identical by most consumers. The relevant cost functions are (Q) = 2Qi, and the inverse market demand curve for this unique product %3D is given by P= 650-3 Q. Currently, you and your rival simultaneously (but independently) make production decisions, and the price you fetch for the product depends on the total amount produced by each firm. However, by making an unrecoverable fixed investment of $1,800, Taurus Technologies can bring its product to market before Spyder finalizes production plans. (Assume Taurus Technologies is the leader in this scenario.) What are your profits if you do not make the investment? %24 What are your profits if you do make the investment? Instructions: Do not include the investment of $1,800 as part of your profit calculation. %24

You are the manager of Taurus Technologies, and your sole competitor is Spyder Technologies. The two firms' products are viewed as identical by most consumers. The relevant cost functions are (Q) = 2Qi, and the inverse market demand curve for this unique product %3D is given by P= 650-3 Q. Currently, you and your rival simultaneously (but independently) make production decisions, and the price you fetch for the product depends on the total amount produced by each firm. However, by making an unrecoverable fixed investment of $1,800, Taurus Technologies can bring its product to market before Spyder finalizes production plans. (Assume Taurus Technologies is the leader in this scenario.) What are your profits if you do not make the investment? %24 What are your profits if you do make the investment? Instructions: Do not include the investment of $1,800 as part of your profit calculation. %24

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Can someone please explain how to answer this using piecewise function?
Please answer fast
Assume that there are two firms in the market described by the inverse demand function P(q1,q2)=186 - (2/2)(q1+q2). Firm 1 has marginal costs of 51 and decides on first. Firm 2 has marginal costs of 62 and moves second. Both firms decide on quanties once. How much does firm 1 produce in equilibrium? (answer to 2 decimal places)
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