You are a bidder in an independent private auction, and you value the object at $2000. Each bidder assumes that the valuations are uniformly distributed between $1000 and $5000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price sealed bid auction when the total number of bidders are: 2, 10, and 100.
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You are a bidder in an independent private auction, and you value the object at $2000. Each bidder assumes that the valuations are uniformly distributed between $1000 and $5000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price sealed bid auction when the total number of bidders are: 2, 10, and 100.
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- Consider 5 bidders whose values are independently and uniformly distributed over [0, 900] (a) For a buyer with value 100, what is his equilibrium bid in a first-price auction (FPA)?The Government of Malaca has decided to sell pollution permits that will allow people to discharge pollutants into its largest freshwater lake. Each permit represents the right to discharge one tonne of pollutants. Malaca has determined that the lake will tolerate a maximum of 10 tonnes of pollutants per year and has decided to sell the permits using a Dutch auction. This means that the auction starts at a very high price, which is reduced in steps until the price reaches a level that will result in all 10 tonnes of pollution permits being sold at the same price. The results of the bidding are shown in table below. Price per Pollution Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder Permit A. B D $5, 500 1 5,000 4,500 4,000 1. 1. 1 2 2. 3 2 1 2 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 1,500 7 a. What will be the price of pollution permits as a result of this auction? Price: $ b. Suppose that Bidder E happened to be an environmental protection group. If this group had not participated in the…At an oral auction for a lamp, half of all bidders have a value of $50 and half have a value of $70. What is the expected winning bid if there are four bidders?
- The Government of Malaca has decided to sell pollution permits that will allow people to discharge pollutants into its largest freshwater lake. Each permit represents the right to discharge one tonne of pollutants. Malaca has determined that the lake will tolerate a maximum of 40 tonnes of pollutants per year and has decided to sell the permits using a Dutch auction. This means that the auction starts at a very high price, which is reduced in steps until the price reaches a level that will result in all 40 tonnes of pollution permits being sold at the same price. The results of the bidding are shown in table below. Price per PollutionPermit BidderA BidderB BidderC BidderD BidderE $5,500 2 5,000 4 6 4,500 6 6 1 1 1 4,000 8 7 2 2 2 3,500 10 7 4 3 3 3,000 12 9 6 3 4 2,500 14 10 8 3 5 2,000 16 11 9 4 6 1,500 18 12 10 4 7 a. What will be the price of pollution permits as a result of this auction? Price: $ b. Suppose that Bidder E happened to be an…Suppose there are two bidders for a single object. Each bidder has a value for the object, v1 and v2, which is randomly drawn uniformly from 0 to 80. (Note that this means the probability that a value is 25 or lower is 25/80, and more generally, the probability that a value is k or lower is k/80). Bidders see their own values but not the values of their rival bidders. Consider a first price sealed bid auction where the winner of the object is the bidder who submits the highest bid and pays the price that he bid. Suppose that you are bidder 1 and you believe that your rival always bids a constant fraction α of his value. (For example, if bidder 2’ value is 15, he will bid 15α.). 1. What is your expected winning probability of the auction from any given bid b1? (You win the auction when your bid amount b1 is greater than your opponent’s bid). 2. What is your expected payoff from any given bid, b1? (Write answer as a function of v1, b1, and α). 3. Compute your best response bid given your…Assume that two collectors, X and Y are in a first prize sealed bid auction for a batch of vintage comic books. X and Y have different valuations (V) for this batch of comic books e.g. VX And VB are between $2000 and $4000. Both collectors know their own V but does not know the V of the other collector. All they know is that the other collector’s V is a uniformly distributed number between $2000 and $4000. Assume risk neutrality for X and Y e.g. expected payoff for X is: (VX – bX)Pr(bX) and expected payoff for Y is (VY – bY)Pr(bY). These collectors will make their bids strategically. Show how X’s bidding strategy is bX = ½ Vx + 1 and Y’s is bY = ½ Vy +1 in a Nash equilibrium.
- Suppose two bidders compete for a single indivisible item (e.g., a used car, a piece of art, etc.). We assume that bidder 1 values the item at $v1, and bidder 2 values the item at $v2. We assume that v1 > v2. In this problem we study a second price auction, which proceeds as follows. Each player i = 1, 2 simultaneously chooses a bid bi ≥ 0. The higher of the two bidders wins, and pays the second highest bid (in this case, the other player’s bid). In case of a tie, suppose the item goes to bidder 1. If a bidder does not win, their payoff is zero; if the bidder wins, their payoff is their value minus the second highest bid. a) Now suppose that player 1 bids b1 = v2 and player 2 bids b2 = v1, i.e., they both bid the value of the other player. (Note that in this case, player 2 is bidding above their value!) Show that this is a pure NE of the second price auction. (Note that in this pure NE the player with the lower value wins, while in the weak dominant strategy equilibrium where both…Consider a Common Value auction with two bidders who both receive a signal X that is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The (common) value V of the good the players are bidding for is the average of the two signals, i.e. V = (X1+X2)/2. the symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for the second-price sealed-bid auction assuming that players are risk-neutral and have standard selfish preferences. Furthermore, you may assume that the other bidder is following a linear bidding strategy. Make sure to explain your notation and the steps you take to derive the result.There are 4 bidders with valuations that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In equilibrium, what is the probability that the highest bid is less than 0.2 in a first-price auction? Round your answer to two decimal places.
- Suppose there are N bidders competing for a single object in an all-pay auction. Each bidder has an i.i.d value vi for the object drawn from some continuous distribution F with support [0, M ]. (a) Show that there is a symmetric equilibrium in increasing strategies. (b) What is the expected revenue generated by this auction in the equilibrium from (a)? Elaborate the explanation on both the answers.A cool kid is willing to rename himself for a profit. He decides to auctionoff the naming right. Two bidders show interest. Their valuations for thenaming right are independently and uniformly distributed over [0,100].There are several possible ideas to design the auction. a) The auction runs as follows. Both bidders are invited to the sameroom; an auctioneer will start the auction with an initial price 0, and increase it by $1 every minute. The bidders are not allowed to say anything during the process, but they can walk out of the room at any moment. If one bidder walks out of the room when the price increases to p (the bidder does not need to pay), the remaining bidder will be awarded the naming right for a price of p. If both walk out when the price reaches p, the naming right is not assigned and the two bidders do not need to pay. What should the bidders do? Explain your answer. (b) Both bidders are invited to submit their bids covertly (bids are non-negative real numbers).…Q1 Market-clearing Prices Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Position T receives rT = 150 clicks per day and position B receives TB = 50 clicks per day. There are four bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: vị = 8, v2 = 6, v3 = 4, v4 = 2. (a) Find the efficient assignment. (b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices. (c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices. (d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.