Q1Market-clearing PricesConsider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). PositionT receives rT = 150 clicks per day and position B receives TB = 50 clicks per day. There arefour bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: vị = 8, v2 = 6, v3 = 4, v4 = 2.(a) Find the efficient assignment.(b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices.(c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices.(d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.

Different parties may bid for the right to buy an item or service at an auction.Auctions are seen to…

Q1 Market-clearing Prices Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Position T receives ¤7 = 150 clicks per day and position B receives rB = 50 clicks per day. There are four bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: v1 = 8, vz = 6, v3 = 4, v4 = 2. %3D (a) Find the efficient assignment. (b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices. (c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices. (d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.

Q1 Market-clearing Prices Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Position T receives ¤7 = 150 clicks per day and position B receives rB = 50 clicks per day. There are four bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: v1 = 8, vz = 6, v3 = 4, v4 = 2. %3D (a) Find the efficient assignment. (b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices. (c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices. (d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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