ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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PLEAS ANSWER Q3 and Q4
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- D3)arrow_forwardThe following table shows cost payoffs for four decision variables and four states of nature. S₁ S2 di 20 20 S S3 54 8 19 4 d2 12 12 40 d3 10 10 16 16 16 d4 30 30 25 20 20 9 110 14 14 Suppose the decision maker assigns the probability for S₁ = 0.10; S2 = 0.40; S3 = 0.20; and S4 = 0.30, what is the expected value of best decision? 21.2 21.8 20 19.2arrow_forwardDon't give poor answerarrow_forward
- Channels 7 and 10 are the only television networks. They want to capture as much of the market as possible because it helps them earn more advertising revenue. Each channel can choose to show a cooking or a reality show on Sunday night. If they both airing cooking shows or both airing reality shows, Channel 10 gets 60% of the market. If Channel 10 is showing a cooking show and Channel 7 is showing a reality show, Channel 10 gets 70% of the market. If Channel 10 is showing a reality show and Channel 7 is showing a cooking show, Channel 7 gets 45% of the market. In a sequential game, Channel 7 moves first. What is true? Group of answer choices Channel 7 will choose reality. Channel 7 has a second mover advantage. Channel 10 will choose cooking. Channel 10 will choose reality. Channel 7 will choose cooking.arrow_forwardThere are two types of workers in financial industry: A (able) type and C (challenged) type. Potential employers in finance will pay $160,000 a year to a type A and $60,000 to a type C. Unfortunately, employers cannot observe the worker's type while each worker knows his or her own type. However, a market research informs all employers and workers that 60% of the population is type A and 40% is type C. a) Assume that employers in finance treat every applicant as a random draw from the population and pay all the same salary. Then, the pooling salary is $ thousands separator). (Hint: omit the b) Alternative employment opportunities outside of the financial industry yield the A types a salary of $125,000 and the C types a salary of $30,000. If the pooling salary in a) is offered to any applicant in finance, type workers will leave the financial industry and only type workers will stay in the industry. When this continues, the salary in finance will eventually reduce to $ (Hint: omit the…arrow_forwardExercise 1.4. There are two players. Each player is given an unmarked envelope and asked to put in it either nothing or $300 of his own money or $600. A referee collects the envelopes, opens them, gathers all the money, then adds 50% of that amount (using his own money) and divides the total into two equal parts which he then distributes to the players. (a) Represent this game frame with two alternative tables: the first table showing in each cell the amount of money distributed to Player 1 and the amount of money distributed to Player 2, the second table showing the change in wealth of each player (money received minus contribution). (b) Suppose that Player 1 has some animosity towards the referee and ranks the outcomes in terms of how much money the referee loses (the more, the better), while Player 2 is selfish and greedy and ranks the outcomes in terms of her own net gain. Represent the corresponding game using a table. (c) Is there a strict dominant-strategy equilibrium?arrow_forward
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