Marketers from a media website want to nudge their customers to upgrade their free membership to paid membership. To do so, they sent out two emails. Email 1 was sent out 10,000 emails to their customer base. Of which 1000 emails were opened. 500 of those consumers further clicked on some part of the email. Of those 500 customers, 20 signed up for upgrading their membership. Email 2 was sent out 10,000 emails to their customer base. Of which 600 emails were opened. 300,of those consumers further clicked on some part of the email. Of those 300 customers, 30 signed up for upgrading their membership. If you were optimizing for open rate, which would be the winner email? And what are the open rates for both the emails.

AirPorter (AP) Don't offer Offer Don't offer AP earns $8,000 LimoZeenz (LZ) AP earns $10,000 LZ earns $16,000 LZ earns $8,000 AP earns $15,000 AP earns $12,000 Offer LZ earns $12,000 AirPorter offers the discount, but LimoZeenz does not. Both LimoZeenz and AirPorter do not offer the discount. There is no Nash equilibrium. LimoZeenz offers the discount, but AirPorter does not. LZ earns $6,000 LimoZeenz and AirPorter and are the only two airport shuttle. Each firm must decide on whether to offer its customers a mid-week discount for airport transportation. The table above shows the payoff matrix for profits earned by each company based on either offering or not offering the discount. Refer to the table above, what is the Nash equilibrium in this game?

You are considering subscribing to Hulu.  You are willing to pay up to $39 per year for a subscription.  The current annual price is $109.  Calculate your consumer surplus under these circumstances.

Disney operates two theme parks in California: Disneyland and California Adventure. Disney has long charged the same price for the two parks, currently $400 per day for a four-person family. However with fewer tourists and more local visitors over the past year, Disney is considering park-specific pricing along with a “weekender” bundle. Disney media have different appeal to boys and girls, which affects demand for theme parks. Disney estimates demand for three family types: Boy (B), Girl (G) and Mixed (M). Each family buys at most one ticket of each type, and there are 1 million families of each type each month. Maximum willingness to pay for each park for each family is shown in the table below. Assume the marginal cost per family per park is $150. Family Type Disneyland (DL) CA Adventure (CA) Bundle G $700 $200 $900 M   $300 $300 $600 B $200 $500 $700 Cost = $150 per family per park a. What are the profit-maximizing prices for Disneyland and California Adventure if tickets are…