Your company has a customer list that includes 3000 people. Your market research indicates that 90 of them responded to the coupon. If you send a coupon to ONE customer at random, what’s the probability that he or she will use the coupon? Group of answer choices 3%. 9%. 30%. 90%. None of the above.

Your company has a customer list that includes 3000 people. Your market research indicates that 90 of them responded to the coupon. If you send a coupon to ONE customer at random, what’s the probability that he or she will use the coupon? Group of answer choices 3%. 9%. 30%. 90%. None of the above.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7MC

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