ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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U(W) in an appropriate utility function, where W is the level of wealth. Which of the following is TRUE for a risk-loving investor?
Select one:
A. U[E(W)] < E[U(W)]
B. U[E(W)] > E[U(W)]
C. U[E(W)] = E[U(W)] = 0
D. U[E(W)] = E[U(W)]
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