To achieve Pareto optimum in a Prisoner's Dilemma, we assume that the players confess pick the best individual payoff I choose to use one of my three skips on this question. work together

Imagine that there are two snowboard manufacturers (FatSki and WideBoard) in the market. Each firm can either produce ten or twenty snowboards per day. The table below (see attached) shows the profit per snowboard for each firm that will result given the joint production decisions of these two firms. Draw the game payoff matrix for this situation.  Does either player have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?  What is the Nash equilibrium solution and how many boards should each player produce each day?  Since FatSki and WideBoard must play this game repeatedly (i.e. make production decisions every day), what strategy would you advise them to play in order to maximize their payoff over the long term?

We can see from the payoff matrix that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game because at least one firm would always have an incentive to change its behavior. ​ From​ Nash's​ theorem, we know there must be at least one Nash equilibrium so there must be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this game. Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium by first deleting all dominated strategies in the game What's the expected payoff to Firm 2 in the equilibrium?

A "Prisoner's Dilemma" is a situation in which both parties: a) have an incentive to cooperate(meaning working with the other criminal by keeping one's mouth shut) even without communication b) have an incentive to  not cooperate(meaning working with other criminal by keeping one's mouth shut) even through cooperation would be mutually benefical. c)have no incentives to cooperate or not cooperate because either way they lose.

Problem 2. Consider the partnership-game we discussed in Lecture 3 (pages 81-87 of the textbook). Now change the setup of the game so that player 1 chooses x = [0, 4], and after observing the choice of x, player 2 chooses y ≤ [0, 4]. The payoffs are the same as before. (a) Find all SPNE (subgame perfect Nash equilibria) in pure strategies. (b) Can you find a Nash equilibrium, with player 1 choosing x = 1, that is not subgame perfect? Explain.

Suppose two players play the prisoners' dilemma game a finite number of times, both players are rational, and the game is played with complete information, is a tit-for-tat strategy optimal in this case? Explain using your own words.

Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.         Player 2       Strategy  X Y Player 1  A      30, 30              16, -50 B     -50, 16        50, 50 A. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication.  check all that apply (16, −50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) (50, 50) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? multiple choice (16, −50) (50, 50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) B. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? multiple choice  A or B What outcome do you think would occur as a result? multiple choice  (−50, 16) (16, −50) (30, 30) (50, 50) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is…