The St Petersburg Paradox involves a coin tossing game. The player tosses a fair coin as many times as is necessary until it comes up heads. The game yields a prize equal to £ 2", where n is the total number of tosses made. What is the expected value of the game? A £4 B) £8 C) £2 D Infinite E) £16

The St Petersburg Paradox involves a coin tossing game. The player tosses a fair coin as many times as is necessary until it comes up heads. The game yields a prize equal to £ 2", where n is the total number of tosses made. What is the expected value of the game? A £4 B) £8 C) £2 D Infinite E) £16

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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