The board of a football club consists of three extremely wealthy owners and five fans of the club. To decide on a proposal, the board uses a voting game in which all three wealthy owners and at least two fans must vote in favour in order for the proposal to be accepted. (a) Show that the voting game use by the board for deciding whether to approve a motion can be weighted. (b) For the voting game used by the board, find the Shapley-Shubik index of each fan. Hence, or otherwise, find the Shapley-Shubik index of each extremely wealthy owner.

The board of a football club consists of three extremely wealthy owners and five fans of the club. To decide on a proposal, the board uses a voting game in which all three wealthy owners and at least two fans must vote in favour in order for the proposal to be accepted. (a) Show that the voting game use by the board for deciding whether to approve a motion can be weighted. (b) For the voting game used by the board, find the Shapley-Shubik index of each fan. Hence, or otherwise, find the Shapley-Shubik index of each extremely wealthy owner.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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