payoffs

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question
A buyer and a seller each have private information about their own valuations of a
single object that the seller may sell to the buyer. The buyer's valuation, denoted
V, and the seller's valuation, denoted v,, are independently drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0, 1]. The buyer names an offer price, Pb (a nonnegative
number), and the seller simultaneously names an asking price, p, (a nonnegative
number). If p, < Ps, there is no trade; the payoffs to both the buyer and the seller are
0. If p. > Ps, trade occurs at the price p = tp); the payoff to the buyer is v, – p
and the payoff to the seller is p- vs.
2
Transcribed Image Text:A buyer and a seller each have private information about their own valuations of a single object that the seller may sell to the buyer. The buyer's valuation, denoted V, and the seller's valuation, denoted v,, are independently drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. The buyer names an offer price, Pb (a nonnegative number), and the seller simultaneously names an asking price, p, (a nonnegative number). If p, < Ps, there is no trade; the payoffs to both the buyer and the seller are 0. If p. > Ps, trade occurs at the price p = tp); the payoff to the buyer is v, – p and the payoff to the seller is p- vs. 2
(a) Specify the strategic situation as a Bayesian game.
(b) Find all the values of a such that the game has a Nash equilibrium in which the
buyer offers æ if v, > r and 0 otherwise, and the seller asks r if v, < x and 1
otherwise.
(c) (optional) Show that the game has a Nash equilibrium in which the buyer uses
the linear offer price function p(vb)
price function p,(v.) = v, +.
vr +5 and the seller uses the linear ask
%3D
Transcribed Image Text:(a) Specify the strategic situation as a Bayesian game. (b) Find all the values of a such that the game has a Nash equilibrium in which the buyer offers æ if v, > r and 0 otherwise, and the seller asks r if v, < x and 1 otherwise. (c) (optional) Show that the game has a Nash equilibrium in which the buyer uses the linear offer price function p(vb) price function p,(v.) = v, +. vr +5 and the seller uses the linear ask %3D
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 5 steps with 29 images

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Personal Valuation
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education