Consider the following extensive-form game. (1) U D A B A B 6,6 X Y X Y P 3,8 8, 1 1,2 -2,1 5,5 -0,0 The dashed lines represent information sets. (a) Represent this game in normal-form. (b) Derive the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (c) Describe the (proper) subgames of this game. (d) Derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

Consider the following extensive-form game. (1) U D A B A B 6,6 X Y X Y P 3,8 8, 1 1,2 -2,1 5,5 -0,0 The dashed lines represent information sets. (a) Represent this game in normal-form. (b) Derive the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (c) Describe the (proper) subgames of this game. (d) Derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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1. Consider the following normal-form game: Player 2 Left Right 30,20 10,10 10,30 20,20 Player 1 How many pure-strategy Nash Equilibria are there in this game? (a) 0 (b) 1 Up Down (c) 2 (d) 3 (e) 4 (f) None of the above Answer: 1b. The only Nash Equilirbium is (Up,Left).
Consider the following normal-form game (a) Calculate the rationalizable set ? (b) Find all Nash equilibria. (c) Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
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Which is false for the following game? C R. T. 3, 2 0,3 3, 3 M 5,0 4, 1 3, 1 B 2, 2 4, 5 1, 1 A. (M,C) and (B,C) are the only pure strategy Nash Equilibria OB. There is a Nash cquilibrium in which R is played with positive probability C. There is no Nash equilibrium in which L is played with positive probability OD. There is no Nash equilibrium in which both players choose two of their actions with positive probability
Consider the attached extensive-form game tree, where player 1 moves first, then player 2. The top payoff accrues to player 1, the bottom payoff to player 2. (a) Draw the strategic form for this extensive form game.(b) Find all of the Nash equilibria, including any mixed.(c) Which of these Nash equilibria do you think would be actually played? Why?
Consider the payoff matrix listed below: IS |1, -1 3, 0 |2, 1 0, 3 1, 2 |0, 0 3, 1 5, 3 2, 1 What is the Nash Equilibium of the game? a. (B, R) b. (U, Q) c. (B, S) d. (C, Q) M/2/6
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I need answer of part b c and d
Consider the payoff matrix below, which describes a symmetric A B A 17,17 0,14 B 14,0 8,8 (a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game, including any mixed strategy equilibria. (b) Draw the expected payoff difference diagram for this game, including all the Nash equilibria you found in (a). is (c) What would you expect to occur most frequently when this game played as a lab experiment? Justify your answer using your answers from (a) and (b).
NE 2). Consider the following extensive form game between two players. (1,10) u D 1 B X (a) List all pure strategies of player 2. (b) Represent this game in normal form. (c) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (d) Find all SPNE (in pure strategies) of this game. (6,3) (4,2) (5,1)