Consider the following extensive-form game. (1) U D A B A B 6,6 X Y X Y P 3,8 8, 1 1,2 -2,1 5,5 -0,0 The dashed lines represent information sets. (a) Represent this game in normal-form. (b) Derive the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (c) Describe the (proper) subgames of this game. (d) Derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

in text form with proper workings and explanation for each and every part and steps with concept and introduction no AI no copy paste remember answer must be in proper format with all working!!!!!!!

I need answer of part b c and d

Consider the payoff matrix below, which describes a symmetric A B A 17,17 0,14 B 14,0 8,8 (a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game, including any mixed strategy equilibria. (b) Draw the expected payoff difference diagram for this game, including all the Nash equilibria you found in (a). is (c) What would you expect to occur most frequently when this game played as a lab experiment? Justify your answer using your answers from (a) and (b).

Consider the following game:

The hand written is not allowed.