Question #6: Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 432 - 7 Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1 = 8 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2 = 5 Q. (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 90 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 103 .) What is level of total surplus in the duopoly equilibrium ? hint: 8597.86

Question 3:Suppose the inverse demand for a good is given by P = 50 – 4Q, where Q is the totalquantity supplied by all firms in the market. Suppose each firm in the market has a constantmarginal cost of 18.Q3 a) Assume the market consists of two firms that set their quantities simultaneously.Calculate the duopoly levels of production and the equilibrium price. Q3 b) Now assume firm 1 chooses its production level before firm 2 does. What will be theequilibrium quantities, price and profits in this case?Q3 c) Now instead suppose that the two firms compete over prices rather than quantities.What will be the equilibrium price and profits of firms 1 and 2 in this case? Finally, if firm 1manages to lower its marginal cost to 14, what will be the new equilibrium price, quantitiesand profits?

Suppose Giocattolo of Italy and American Toy Company of the United States are the only two firms producing toys for sale in the U.S. market. Each firm realizes constant long-term costs so that the average total cost (ATC) equals the marginal cost (MC) at each level of output. Thus, MCo = ATCO is the long-term market supply schedule for toys. Suppose Giocattolo and American Toy Company operate as competitors, and the cost schedules of each company are MCo = ATCO = $10. On the following graph, use the grey point (star symbol) to identify the competitive market equilibrium. Then, use the green triangle (triangle symbols) to identify consumer surplus in this case. Note: Select and drag the point from the palette to the graph. Dashed drop lines will automatically extend to both axes. Then select and drag the shaded region from the palette to the graph. To resize the shaded region, select one of the points and move to the desired position. ? PRICE (Dollars per toy) 20 18 16 14 10 00 6 4 2 0…

Suppose the inverse market demand for manufactures is P(Q) = A – Q, where P and Q denote price and total goods produced and the parameter A denotes the size of the domestic market. Suppose any firm has a cost function, c(q) = cq, where A > c. Suppose there are two firm in the market which produce q1 and q2, where Q = q1 + q 2                                                                                                                                                    a. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium levels of output (Q*), price (P*) and markups.                                                                                       b. What is the impact of an increase in market size, A, on Q*, P* and markups when there are two firms? Provide some intuition for these predictions.                                                                                                                                                                                                   c.…

• Question #21: Consider a Leader-Follower duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 141 - 3 Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 (The Leader) is given by mc1 = 8 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 (The Follower) is given by mc2 = 2 Q. %3D How much consumer surplus is created by industry transactions ? (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 154 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 439 .) • Question #22: Consider a Leader-Follower duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb = 141 - 3 Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 (The Leader) is given by mc1 = 8 Q. The marginal cost for firm 2 (The Follower) is given by mc2 = 2 Q. How much DWL is created by the Leader-Follower industry structure ? (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $ 154 and firm 2 has a fixed cost of $ 439 .)

What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q=4,000-1,000p, and Firm l's and Firm 2's variable cost functions are V (q1) = 0.22qlandV (q2) = 0.22q2 , respectively. Select one alternative: Both firms produce 1300 units of outpuit. Both firms produce 1280 units of output. Both firms produce 1240 units of output. Both firms produce 1260 units of output.

Two firms are engaged in Cournot (simultaneous quantity) competition. Market-level inverse demand is given by P = 160 − 4Q Firm 1 has constant marginal costs of MC1 = 8, while Firm 2 has constant marginal costs of MC2 = 24.           1) Does there exist a low enough positive marginal cost for firm 1 such that firm 1 acts like a monopoly in this market, if so what is the MC if not why?

Suppose the inverse market demand for manufactures is P(Q) = A – Q, where P and Q denote price and total goods produced and the parameter A denotes the size of the domestic market. Suppose any firm has a cost function, c(q) = cq, where A > c. Suppose there are two firm in the market which produce q1 and q2, where Q = q1 + q 2                                                                                                                                                    a. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium levels of output (Q*), price (P*) and markups.                                                                                       b. What is the impact of an increase in market size, A, on Q*, P* and markups when there are two firms? Provide some intuition for these predictions.                                                                                                                                                                                                   c.…

Suppose there are just two firms, 1 and 2, in the oil market and the inverse demand for oil is given by P = 60 – Q. The marginal cost for each firm is €30. What price should Firm 2 charge at the Cournot equilibrium

QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)