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Consider a Bertrand duopoly. Market demand is P(Q)=41-3Q, and each firm faces a marginal cost of $4 per unit

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider a Bertrand duopoly. Market demand is P(Q)=41-3Q, and each firm faces a marginal cost of $4 per unit. How much is the sum of firms' total revenue in the Nash equilibrium?

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