Owen and Simon both like playing with balls and cars. Suppose B represents the number of balls, and C represents the number of cars. If Owen's utility function can be given by U(B, C) 10B + 5C, and Simon's utility function can be given by U(B, C) = 6B + 6C, which of the following trades would be mutually beneficial? a. Owen gives Simon 2 balls in exchange for 3 cars b. Owen gives Simon 2 cars in exchange for 3 balls C. Owen gives Simon 3 cars in exchange for 2 balls d. Owen gives Simon 3 balls in exchange for 2 cars

Owen and Simon both like playing with balls and cars. Suppose B represents the number of balls, and C represents the number of cars. If Owen's utility function can be given by U(B, C) 10B + 5C, and Simon's utility function can be given by U(B, C) = 6B + 6C, which of the following trades would be mutually beneficial? a. Owen gives Simon 2 balls in exchange for 3 cars b. Owen gives Simon 2 cars in exchange for 3 balls C. Owen gives Simon 3 cars in exchange for 2 balls d. Owen gives Simon 3 balls in exchange for 2 cars

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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