Imagine two drivers playing chicken, a game where they drive towards one another with their cars. Each driver has two actions: go straight or turn left. For simplicity, we standardize directions according to the perspective of an overhead observer. Thus, if both drivers select the same action, they will crash. At the same time, each driver wants to go straight, to seem tough and fearless. Utilities are given by the following table: Utility Turn Left Straight Turn Left -20, -20 - 5, 10 Straight 10, -5 -10, -10 These are in the format (row player, column player) 1. Does either player have a dominating strategy? If so, identify all of them. 2. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game? 3. Does the game have any mixed strategy Nash equilibria? If yes, compute all of them.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Imagine two drivers playing chicken, a game where they drive towards one another
with their cars. Each driver has two actions: go straight or turn left. For simplicity, we
standardize directions according to the perspective of an overhead observer. Thus, if
both drivers select the same action, they will crash. At the same time, each driver wants
to go straight, to seem tough and fearless. Utilities are given by the following table:
Utility Turn Left Straight Turn Left -20, -20 - 5, 10 Straight 10, -5 -10, -10 These are in
the format (row player, column player) 1. Does either player have a dominating
strategy? If so, identify all of them. 2. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria of this
game? 3. Does the game have any mixed strategy Nash equilibria? If yes, compute all
of them.
Transcribed Image Text:Imagine two drivers playing chicken, a game where they drive towards one another with their cars. Each driver has two actions: go straight or turn left. For simplicity, we standardize directions according to the perspective of an overhead observer. Thus, if both drivers select the same action, they will crash. At the same time, each driver wants to go straight, to seem tough and fearless. Utilities are given by the following table: Utility Turn Left Straight Turn Left -20, -20 - 5, 10 Straight 10, -5 -10, -10 These are in the format (row player, column player) 1. Does either player have a dominating strategy? If so, identify all of them. 2. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game? 3. Does the game have any mixed strategy Nash equilibria? If yes, compute all of them.
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