Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water.  Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump.  They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear.  To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero.  The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below:   Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) 0 $60 $0 100 55 5,500 200 50 10,000 300 45 13,500 400 40 16,000 500 35 17,500 600 30 18,000 700 25 17,500 800 20 16,000 900 15 13,500 1,000 10 10,000 1,100 5 5,500 1,200 0 0       Refer to Table 17-1.  If this market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, what price would be charged? Group of answer choices $0 $30 $40 $60

In markets with strong network externalities:     a. It is common for the market to be split equally across several firms.   b. Market shares typically fluctuate in opposite directions, i.e. high market share today implies lower market share tomorrow.   c. Market entry happens frequently.   d. A single firm tends to dominate the market.

Help

D.    Pollution problem You know the marginal cost of reducing pollution for four factories.  Each unit of pollution can be eliminated according to the following marginal costs.   A B C D First Unit $65 $15 $30 $10 Second Unit $75 $55 $65 $30 Third Unit $85 $85 $110 $40 Fourth Unit $120 $155 $120 $60   1.  The total cost of Firm D  eliminating 4 units of pollution   2. Determine the total cost of each firm eliminating one unit of production.   3.  The community has decided that the managers of the firms are allowed to produce a total of 4 units of production.   Identify the firm(s) that will pollute.

Please fill in the blanks. Thank you

Quantity (in gallons) Total Price Revenue $8 $0 50 7 350 100 600 150 750 200 4 800 250 3 750 300 600 350 1 350 400 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk. Their respective dairies are equal in size. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce and what price to charge. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero and there are no fixed costs. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table above. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Maria and Miguel from operating as a cartel. Assuming that each producer can only modify quantity in increments of 50, which of the following is consistent with the Nash equilibrium for this scenario? Maria will charge a price of $5 for each gallon. Miguel will sell 100 gallons. Milk will…

Chapter 10 The first government employee suggests reducing pollution through regulation. To meet the pollution goal, the government requires each firm reduce its pollution by 2 units. Complete the following table with the total cost to each firm of reducing its pollution by 2 units. Firm Total Cost of Eliminating Two Units of Pollution (Dollars) Firm A Firm B Firm C ☐☐ Method 2: Tradable Permits Meanwhile, the other employee proposes using a different strategy to achieve the government's goal of reducing pollution in the area from 1 6 units. This employee suggests that the government issue two pollution permits to each firm. For each permit a firm has in its possession, i 1 unit of pollution. Firms are free to trade pollution permits with one another (that is, buy and sell them) as long as both firms can agree on For example, if firm A agrees to sell a permit to firm B at an agreed-upon price, then firm B would end up with three permits and would nee reduce its pollution by only 1 unit…

Acres Sophia Amber Cedric 1 $12 $24 $6 2 8 18 3 10 4 3 8 3 1 6. 2 6 4 1 7 2 Consider the town of Springfield with only three residents, Sophia, Amber, and Cedric (see the Table). The three residents are trying to determine how large, in acres, they should build the public park. Suppose the cost to build the park is $12 per acre and that the residents have agreed to split the cost of building the park equally. If the residents vote to determine the size of park to builo basing their decision solely on their own willingness to pay (and trying to maximize their own surplus), what is the largest park size for which the majority of residents would vote "yes?" 1 acre 2 acres 3 acres 4 acres

Two firms each currently dump 20 tons of pollution a piece into a local river. The government wants to reduce the amount of pollution in the river so they issue 5 permits to each firm. The cost for firm A to reduce their pollution by 1 ton is $1000 and the cost for firm B to reduce their pollution by 1 ton is $800. When answering the questions below simply enter the number for your answer do not write a full sentence. Question 1 If trade is NOT allowed what will be the cost of reducing pollution will be for firm A. total. for firm B, and in

Which are the two key ’problems’ encountered in aggregating on the consumer side, and why it not occurs on the producer side ? Pls short answer in 15-20 Sentences