If firms are in (standard) Cournot competition, we assume that: Group of answer choices Each will ignore their own profit maximization Each will take the other's output as fixed Each will take the other's price as given Each will try to induce the other to produce more output

If firms are in (standard) Cournot competition, we assume that: Group of answer choices Each will ignore their own profit maximization Each will take the other's output as fixed Each will take the other's price as given Each will try to induce the other to produce more output

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

If firms are in (standard) Cournot
competition, we assume that:
Group of answer choices
Each will ignore their own profit
maximization
Each will take the other's output as fixed
Each will take the other's price as given
Each will try to induce the other to produce
more output

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