If firms are in (standard) Cournot competition, we assume that: Group of answer choices Each will ignore their own profit maximization Each will take the other's output as fixed Each will take the other's price as given Each will try to induce the other to produce more output

Suppose two firms, Firm A and Firm B, are competing by setting quantities (Cournot competition). Firm A has a constant marginal cost of $10 per unit; Firm B has a constant marginal cost of $15 per unit. Assume fixed costs are equal to 0 for both firms. Hint: since fixed costs are zero and the marginal cost is constant, MC = AC. The two firms choose between producing 50 units or 100 units. If the total output is 100 units, the price is $20 per unit; if total output is 150 units, the price is $15 per unit; if total output is 200 units, the price is $10 per unit.  Based on the information provided, fill in the firms’ profits in the payoff matrix below with Firm A choosing the row and Firm B choosing the column.      QB=100   QB=50   QA=100   ,   , QA=50   ,   , The resulting equilibrium is for Firm A to produce ____ (50 or 100)units and Firm B to produce_____ (50 or 100) units.

Question 1 Suppose the romaine lettuce industry is a Cournot duopoly with the following two firms: Amalgamated Romaine (a) and Best Romaine (b). The (inverse) market demand schedule is: p = 262 -0.5Q Amalgamated Romaine has the following cost structure: MCATC₁ = $6 Best Romaine has a different cost structure: MC₁ = ATC₁ = $8 Find the following in Cournot-Nash equilibrium. a. Output of Amalgamated Romaine = b. Output of Best Romaine = c. Cournot duopoly equilibrium price = $ units units 3 pts

The demand for a product is Q = a - P/2. If there are 4 firms in an industry and marginal cost is MC = 20, then the price in Nash equilibrium is P = 56. What is a?

Suppose that there are two firms producing a homogenous product and competing in Cournot fashion and let the market demand be given by 0 = 240 -5 Assume for simplicity that each firm operates with zero total cost. Find Cournot Nash equilibrium total surplus 72400 ৪9600 76800 81200

The market for smartphones is an Oligopoly market.  Illustrate how equilibrium price and quantity is determined in this market.

Consider a Stackelberg duopoly:There are two firms in an industry with demand Q = 1 − Pd.The “leader” chooses a quantity qL to produce. The “follower” observes qL and chooses a quantity qF.Suppose now that the cost function is Ci(qi) = qi2  for i = L, F. (a) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium. (b) Compare the equilibrium you found with the Nash equilibrium if the game was simultaneous (i.e., Cournot competition). Is the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game also a Nash equilibrium of the sequential game? Why or why not?

Please solve it complete with details and explanation

Two firms operating in the same market must decide between charging a high price or a low price. The Payoffs are as below. Firm A's profit is listed before the comma, B's profit after the comma. Firm B Firm A Low Price High Price Low Price 16, 17 7, 28 High Price 28, 7 22, 22 If each firm tries to choose a price that is optimal, regardless of the other firm's price, what is the Nash equilibrium? Does either firm have a dominant strategy?

The following integrated series of questions relates to several sections in the text. Scenario 2: Suppose a stream is discovered whose water has remarkable healing powers. You decide to bottle the liquid and sell it. The market demand curve is linear and is given as follows: P = 30 -Q The marginal cost to produce this new drink is $3. Refer to Scenario 2. What will be the price of this new drink in the long run if the industry is a Cournot duopoly? A. $3 В. $9 C. $13.50 D. $12 E. None of the above