Identify the Nash Equilibria and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in pure strategy of this game.   2. Using beliefs (p, 1−p) at P2's decision nodes in their information set, show that one of the NE is not sequentially rational.

Microeconomic Theory
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ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
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Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.1P
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1. Identify the Nash Equilibria and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in pure strategy of this game.

 

2. Using beliefs (p, 1−p) at P2's decision nodes in their information set, show that one of the NE is not sequentially rational.

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