Fountain Corporation’s economists estimate that a good business environment and a bad business environment are equally likely for the coming year. The managers of the company must choose between two mutually exclusive projects. Assume that the project the company chooses will be the firm’s only activity and that the firm will close one year from today. The company is obligated to make a $4,200 payment to bondholders at the end of the year. The projects have the same systematic risk but different volatilities. Consider the following information pertaining to the two projects: Economy Probability Low-Volatility Project Payoff High-Volatility Project Payoff Bad .50 $ 4,200 $ 3,400 Good .50 4,600 4,900 a. What is the expected value of the company if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations.) b. What is the expected value of the company’s equity if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What is it if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations.) c. Which project would the company’s stockholders prefer if they are risk neutral? d. Suppose bondholders are fully aware that stockholders might choose to maximize equity value rather than total company value and opt for the high-volatility project. To minimize this agency cost, the company's bondholders decide to use a bond covenant to stipulate that the bondholders can demand a higher payment if the company chooses to take on the high-volatility project. What payment to bondholders would make stockholders indifferent between the two projects? (Do not round intermediate calculations.)
Fountain Corporation’s economists estimate that a good business environment and a bad business environment are equally likely for the coming year. The managers of the company must choose between two mutually exclusive projects. Assume that the project the company chooses will be the firm’s only activity and that the firm will close one year from today. The company is obligated to make a $4,200 payment to bondholders at the end of the year. The projects have the same systematic risk but different volatilities. Consider the following information pertaining to the two projects: Economy Probability Low-Volatility Project Payoff High-Volatility Project Payoff Bad .50 $ 4,200 $ 3,400 Good .50 4,600 4,900 a. What is the expected value of the company if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations.) b. What is the expected value of the company’s equity if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What is it if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations.) c. Which project would the company’s stockholders prefer if they are risk neutral? d. Suppose bondholders are fully aware that stockholders might choose to maximize equity value rather than total company value and opt for the high-volatility project. To minimize this agency cost, the company's bondholders decide to use a bond covenant to stipulate that the bondholders can demand a higher payment if the company chooses to take on the high-volatility project. What payment to bondholders would make stockholders indifferent between the two projects? (Do not round intermediate calculations.)
Essentials Of Investments
11th Edition
ISBN:9781260013924
Author:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Publisher:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1PS
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Fountain Corporation’s economists estimate that a good business environment and a bad business environment are equally likely for the coming year. The managers of the company must choose between two mutually exclusive projects. Assume that the project the company chooses will be the firm’s only activity and that the firm will close one year from today. The company is obligated to make a $4,200 payment to bondholders at the end of the year. The projects have the same systematic risk but different volatilities. Consider the following information pertaining to the two projects: |
| Economy | Probability | Low-Volatility Project Payoff | High-Volatility Project Payoff |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bad | .50 | $ 4,200 | $ 3,400 |
| Good | .50 | 4,600 | 4,900 |
| a. | What is the expected value of the company if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations.) |
| b. | What is the expected value of the company’s equity if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What is it if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations.) |
| c. | Which project would the company’s stockholders prefer if they are risk neutral? |
| d. | Suppose bondholders are fully aware that stockholders might choose to maximize equity value rather than total company value and opt for the high-volatility project. To minimize this agency cost, the company's bondholders decide to use a bond covenant to stipulate that the bondholders can demand a higher payment if the company chooses to take on the high-volatility project. What payment to bondholders would make stockholders indifferent between the two projects? (Do not round intermediate calculations.) |
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