explain briefly The O-Ring Model proposed by Michael Kremer

Note:Hand written solution should be avoided.

Match the definition to each term listed below. Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Definition A table that shows the payoffs each firm earns from every combination of firm strategies An agreement among firms to charge the same price or otherwise not to compete An option that is better than any alternative option regardless of what the other firm does An outcome of a strategic game from which neither rival wants to deviate A game outcome in which players seek to increase their mutual payoff A practice where one firm initiates a price change and the other firms follow the leader A game in which the firms choose their strategies at the same time One firm's gain must equal the other firm's loss A game in which the sum of Firms select their optimal strategies in a single time period without regard to possible interactions in subsequent time periods A game that occurs more than once the two firms' outcomes is positive Instructions: Enter a numeric response corresponding to the number of the…

5. Two firms compete repeatedly in a market of homogeneous goods. Each year, the firms can choose to charge a low or high price. The following payoff table summarizes their payoffs each year. The competition goes on indefinitely. Let 5 E (0, 1) denote the discount factor for both firms. Firm 2 Low High Low 0, 0 5, 0 Firm 1 High 0, 5 4, 4 Consider an n-period punishment trigger strategy s: • Play "High price" in the first stage. • In stage t> 2, if some player deviated to "Low price" in the last period when he is supposed to play "High price", then play "Low price" for n periods and then restart the game. In other words, after playing "Low price" for n periods, play "High price" in the next stage as if it is the first stage of the game. Otherwise, play "High price". Find the necessary and sufficient condition on & for (s, s) to be an SPE. A sufficiently simplified inequality will do.

Subject: Manegerial economic & policy Q#1)  In your answer to each part below, include references to specific games discussed in thechapter as appropriate.a. If a game has a dominant strategy equilibrium, does it have a Nash equilibrium?b. If a game has a Nash equilibrium, does it have a dominant strategy equilibrium?c. If one firm has a dominant strategy, can another firm take advantage of that fact in decidingon its optimal strategy?d. Can a game have more than one dominant strategy equilibrium? Can a game havemore than one Nash equilibrium?