Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires a lawyer or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time. Diagram this simultaneous-move game. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? Would the sides want to ban lawyers?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter20: The Problem Of Adverse Selection Moral Hazard
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Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new
employment contract by sending their proposals to an
arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively
giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can
choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a
cost of $200,000) who is effective at preparing the
proposal in the best light. If neither hires a lawyer or if
both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half
the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to
win three-quarters of the time.
Diagram this simultaneous-move game.
What is the Nash equilibrium of the game?
Would the sides want to ban lawyers?
Transcribed Image Text:Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires a lawyer or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time. Diagram this simultaneous-move game. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? Would the sides want to ban lawyers?
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