Consider two groups of citizens, each group can either choose to drive x = d or to take public transport x = p. The first group, group 1, enjoys driving and has the following benefit from using their car within the ULEZ area: B1(x1 = d) = 18. The second group, group 2, does not enjoy driving and has a benefit of B2(x2 = d) = 0 from driving their car. If they don’t drive, citizens can use public transport to get around. The benefit of doing so is the same for both groups: B1(x1 = p) = B2(x2 = p) = 10. Both groups drive cars that do not meet the ULEZ requirements and therefore create excessive pollution. For simplicity, we consider that pollution, and the health problems it induces, are the main cost of driving. This cost is imposed on both groups and is equal to Ci(x1 = d, x2 = d) = 10 if both groups drive, Ci(x1 = p, x2 = d) = Ci(x1 = d, x2 = p) = 5 if only one group drives and Ci(x1 = p, x2 = p) = 0 if neither group drives, where i represents either group 1 or group 2. The utility of each group from choosing action xi is equal to the benefits minus the costs: Ui(xi , xj ) = Bi(xi) − Ci(xi , xj ), where i ∈ {1, 2}.
1. Compute the utility of group 1 from driving when group 2 takes public transport: U1(x1 = d, x2 = p). Compute the utility of group 1 from taking public transport when group 2 takes public transport: U1(x1 = p, x2 = p). Does group 1 prefer to drive or take public transport, given that group 2 takes public transport?
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- Ex 8. An airline's data indicate that 50 percent of people who begin the online process of booking a flight never complete the process and pay for the flight. To reduce this percentage, the airline is considering changing its website so that the entire booking process, including flight and seat selection and payment, can be done on two simple pages rather than the current four pages. A random sample of 300 customers who begin the booking process are exposed to the new system, and 117 of them do not complete the process. a. Formulate the null and alternative hypotheses needed to attempt to provide evidence that the new system has reduced the noncompletion percentage. b. Use critical values to perform the hypothesis test by setting α equal to .10, .05, .01, and .001arrow_forwardThe government would like to introduce a subsidy to help citizens who need their car for work and cannot afford to buy a ULEZ-compliant car. It also wants to ensure that only citizens who need to drive their car regularly use the subsidy. Instead of the two groups of citizens discussed above, we focus on one particular citizen who does not drive very often, only once a year. As a result, this citizen does not emit excessive pollution even with a car that is not ULEZ-compliant. The government would therefore prefer citizens like her not to buy a new car to avoid having to pay the subsidy unnecessarily. Once a year, the citizen derives a benefit of driving through the ULEZ area of B = 20. She can choose to either buy a new ULEZ-compliant car at a cost of C = 10, 000, denoted x = new, or stick with her old car at no cost, denoted x = old.If she sticks with her old car, she has to pay a ULEZ fee of τ = 12.50 on the day that she drives. Her net benefit of driving on that day is therefore…arrow_forwardIf Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) powers vehicles and is an almost pollution-free fuel. If factory equipped, vehicles can switch between using either CNG or ordinary gasoline. It costs under $4000 extra to buy such a factory-equipped auto. However, the auto industry makes little effort to promote the use of CNG. Instead, the auto industry is rushing to introduce battery-powered autos that use expensive, heavy and dangerous Lithium Ion batteries. Suppose the government sufficiently subsidized the installation of CNG pumps at public service stations. QUESION: Would the effect on demand for CNG powered autos INCREASE OR DECREASE?arrow_forward
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