Consider the following static Bayesian game: 1. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1 or as in Game 2, each game being equally likely. 2. Column player learns whether nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but Row player does not. 3. Row player chooses either T or B. Column player simultaneously chooses either L or R. 4. The payoffs are given by the game drawn by nature. Column Column

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This payoff matrix shows a two-player variant of the sushi game, but where B really loves sushi, so her payoffs from getting to eat sushi are higher than A's, and her payoffs from there not being enough sushi are lower than A's. Payoffs are ordered A, B. В A 10, 15 10, 25 20, 15 0, -5 A. Find and state all of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the game. If there are multiple equilibria, number them in preparation for answering part "c." B. (From the week 6 lectures) Draw a graph of the expected payoffs for each player. Use these graphs to formulate the decision rule for each player. C. (From the week 6 lectures) Draw a graph of the best replies of the two players. Carefully label each Nash equilibrium.

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.      Player 2   Strategy C D E F Player 1 A 9, 8 14, 14 18, 25 12, 19 B 23, 13 10, 18 14, 26 19, 21 a. What is player 1’s optimal strategy?  multiple choice Strategy B Strategy A Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. b. Determine player 1’s equilibrium payoff.           Prev