Consider a two-firm model with a negative production externality. Let xi denote firm i’s output, with i = 1, 2. Suppose that two firms operate in two different competitive markets and each firm sells its product in its respective competitive market, at the prices p1 = 100 and p2 = 150, respectively, and that they face the same direct
production cost ci (xi ) = xi2 /2. Let e(x1 , x2 ) = x1 x2 be the external cost on firm 2’s activity
generated by the production of firm 1.
-
Find each firm’s best response function to the output set by the other firm
and compute the Nash equilibrium assuming that firms choose their output non-cooperatively and independently. Illustrate the equilibrium in an appropriate graph.
-
Calculate each firm’s equilibrium profits and the total external cost imposed on firm 2.
-
c. Rational choice theory assumes that economic agents are rational and self-interested. Based on the evidence from behavioural laboratory experiments (e.g., dictator games), behavioural economists suggest that people are not always self-interested, rather they have intrinsic preferences for others’ well-being (e.g., altruism, inequity aversion). However, some other studies in behavioural economics investigate this further and disentangle the intrinsic preferences into several other factors. Following the discussion in the lecture, state two such studies that try to disentangle the true intrinsic preferences based on dictator games in the lab. Explain clearly and briefly the following: (i) what each study addresses; (ii) brief description of the experimental design; and (iii) intuitive explanations.
Trending nowThis is a popular solution!
Step by stepSolved in 3 steps with 1 images
- 1. It is 1908 and you are the CEO of Ford Motor Company. General Motors startedproducing cars this year and has quickly become your chief rival. Their recent entrance, as wellas your assembly line methods, allows you the advantage of producing cars faster and choosingyour output levels first. Assume the 1908 inverse demand function for cars is P = 3900 - Q(customers view cars as identical products at this point in time) and production costs are C(qi) =100qi. a. What is Ford’s profit-maximizing output level? GM's?b. What is the market equilibrium price?c. How much profit does each firm earn?d. As the assembly line is used by other firms, the first-mover advantage disappears (fast forward100 years to present day), and more firms have entered the market (e.g. FCA, Tesla, Hyundai,Toyota, Honda, etc.), what do you expect to happen to Ford’s profit (assume demand andcosts are the same)? Explain.e. From 1908 into the 1920s, Ford offered customers one car: the Model T. Further, Henry isfamous…arrow_forwardConsider the linear city (Hotelling's) model we studied in class. Firm 1 and Firm 2 are the two firms in the city. Consider each of the following statements in isolation. Which statement is correct? Group of answer choices Suppose city zoning laws force Firm 1 and Firm 2 to locate at either end of the city. Both firms will therefore set price close to marginal cost Suppose a regulator sets the price for both firms at p; both firms will therefore choose to locate as close to each other as possible If consumers are evenly spread throughout the city, firms are more likely to locate in the middle of the city If transport costs are low, the firms will exploit this by raising price None of the other answers are correctarrow_forwardTwo firms, Incumbent & Entrant, can produce the same good. The market demand for the good is given by P = 180 – Q, where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The firms must pay w = 45 per unit of output for labour and r = 45 per unit of output for capital (one unit of capital is used per unit of output), but Incumbent may choose capacity KI units of capital before Entrant decides whether to enter the market. Suppose firms each have fixed costs FI =600, FE=500. Incumbent chooses (as a Stackelberg leader) capacity KI equal to the monopoly profit- maximizing quantity. When you answer the following questions, show your work. a. Would Incumbent be able to prevent entry by choosing capacity KI equal to the monopoly profit-maximizing quantity? Explain. b. What is the Incumbent’s equilibrium choice of capacity KI in this Dixit game? c. Does the Incumbent’s choice of capacity KI in part (b) qualify as predatory conduct (here, limit output)? Explain.arrow_forward
- An economy with many consumers (Amy, Hao, ...), many producers, two goods (A and B) and two inputs (L and K) is in a competitive general equilibrium. Which of the following conditions are satisfied in this economy? (Select all that apply) The absolute value of the slope of PPF (with good A on the horizontal axis) is equal to MCA / MCB, the ratio of marginal costs of producing goods A and B, at any point on PPF MRSAB = PA / PB for all consumers For every possible redistribution of goods among the consumers, some of them will be better off and some of them will be worse off. MRS = MRT MRS MRTS PA = MCA and PB = MCB MUAmy = MUHao A = PA MRTS = PA / PB MUAmy A = MCA and MUAmy B = MCB MRTS between labour and capital is the same for all firms, whether producing good A or good B. the ratio of input marginal products must be equal to the ratio of input prices MRT = MRTS for all firms, whether producing good A or good B For every possible redistribution of inputs among the firms, the quantity…arrow_forwardSuppose that there are two fancy hotels on the online booking platform, say W hotel and Ritz Carlton hotel. Each hotel has the capacity of 20 rooms on the New Year Eve. There are 20 families who are planning to stay at Bay Areas. Suppose that you are the manager and you set the price to maximize the hotel profit. The marginal cost of each hotel room = 500 RMB The largest valuation on the hotel room = 2000 RMB valuation decrease by 100RMS. In total, there are 20 families. Discuss with your peers how many rooms you will offer in the market.arrow_forwardUsing the Surplus Approach, describe how tendencies for concentration emerge from the regular functioning of competition between capitalist firms.arrow_forward
- am. 128.arrow_forwardSolve the following questionarrow_forwardIn October 2018 Canada agree to open the dairy market to US producers as part of the new NAFTA agreement (USMCA). Use the following information to find the price and the number of firms in each country's market, and the price and number of firms in the aggregate market. Demand function For country i (i=USA or Canada) P, = 6000 + 25 Cost Function C, = 1,000, 000+ 6000 * Q, For country i (i=USA or Canada) Market size • Market size Canada Scananda = 1,000, 000 • Market size USA S,"S= 4,000, 000 The number of firms in Canada is equal to: Answer: Price in Canada is equal to: Answer: Number of firms in USA is equal to: Answer: Price in USA is equal to Answer: Number of firms in the integrated market is equal to: Answer:arrow_forward
- The pie chart to the right illustrates hypothetical data for the market share for the United States automobile market. The percentage of the U.S. market that U.S. auto firms control is nothing%. (Enter your response as an integer.) The image is a pie chart labeled U.S. Automobile Industry Market Share. The pie chart shows the market share of the United States, Japan, Europe, and Korea in the U.S. automobile industry. The market share of the United States is 45%. The market share of Japan is 30%. The market share of Europe is 15%. The market share of Korea is 10%. U.S. Automobile Industry Market Share U.S. 45%Japanese 30%European 15%Korean 10%arrow_forwardAn industry consists of two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. The demand function for the product of each firmsis given by q1 = 720 - 3p1 + 2p2 and q2 = 720 - 3p2 + 2p1. We assume for simplicity that the totalcost of production is zero:TC1 =TC2 =0. a) Are these two products substitutes or complements? Assuming that firms compete over prices, find theprice best-response functions for firm 1 and fin 2. Draw a diagram that shows the BRFs and theequilibrium. Are prices strategic substitutes or complements? Find the Bertrand Nash equilibrium inprices and outputs. Obtain the profits of each firm. b) Show that the duopolists have incentives to collude. Find their joint profit-maximizing price, output, andprofit: find each firm's price. output and protit. Is collusion a Nash equilibrium? If not, what is the optimaldefection for each firm? Show this game in a 2X2 matrix form. What does this imply about the Nashequilibrium or the stability of their collusive agreement? Is it a Prisoner's Dilemma…arrow_forwardYou manage a company that competes in an industry that is comprised of 3 equal-sized firms that produce similar products. A recent industry report indicates that the market is fairly saturated, in that a 10 percent industry-wide price increase would lead to a 22 percent decline in units sold by all firms in the industry. Currently, Congress is considering legislation that would impose a tariff on a key input used by the industry. Your best estimate is that, if the legislation passes, your marginal cost will increase by 1 dollar. Based on this information, what price increase would you recommend if the tariff legislation is passed by Congress? Instructions: Enter your response rounded to the nearest penny (two decimal places).arrow_forward
- Principles of Economics (12th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134078779Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. OsterPublisher:PEARSONEngineering Economy (17th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134870069Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick KoellingPublisher:PEARSON
- Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781305585126Author:N. Gregory MankiwPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...EconomicsISBN:9781259290619Author:Michael Baye, Jeff PrincePublisher:McGraw-Hill Education