consider a Bertrand competition in which there are two firms producing a homogenous product. the market DD is D(p) = 200-P firms charge price in Indian rupees in multiples of 5. MC = 25 for both the firms. identify mash equilibrium for the game

consider a Bertrand competition in which there are two firms producing a homogenous product. the market DD is D(p) = 200-P firms charge price in Indian rupees in multiples of 5. MC = 25 for both the firms. identify mash equilibrium for the game

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

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