ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Subject: Manegerial economics & policy
c) Which effect dominates, the
upward sloping?
d) Why might demand be downward sloping in a market with imperfect information even
though the market is otherwise
e) Why are focal points important for noncooperative games?
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