Bargaining power may exist for a seller if they have another buyer to whom they can sell the product.True or False?

The last four questions, not the first four.

Question 4 Calculate the equilibrium price for an illegal good that can be harvested for zero cost when competitive sellers face confiscation and a fine of 600 dollars and the probability of arrest is equal to n = 1/6.

Collusion:  Why is it profitable, but hard to maintain?

Mike and Sophie are splitting up and need to decide who will get the car they purchased together. Using the method of sealed bids, Mike bids $5,000 and Sophie bids $4,500 for the car. Since Mike's bid is higher, he gets the car, and has to compensate Sophie with cash. How much will he have to pay Sophie in order to keep the division fair?

Ready Foods contracts to buy two hundred carloads of frozen pizzas from Speedy Distributors. Before Ready or Speedy starts performing, can the parties call off the deal? What if Speedy has already shipped the pizzas? Explain your answers.

suppose the campus of a university with 1,000 students lies along a street which is one mile long. There are two restaurants that sell pizza by the slice, and they are located at opposite ends of the campus street. Each restaurant can produce a slice of pizza for $1.00 (marginal cost) and the quality of the pizza from the two restaurants is identical. After classes, each student would like to buy one slice of pizza (as long as it costs less than $5.00), but they are evenly distributed along the university campus street and each needs to choose which direction to walk to get pizza. They have a constant disutility of having to walk such that they are willing to pay $2.00 per mile to avoid walking. (You can ignore the presence of other restaurants and assume that students choose between only these two.) 1. If these restaurants simultaneously set prices to maximize profits, what prices will each restaurant set in equilibrium? (You don’t need to derive the equilibrium prices here if you are…

Describe the four fundamental principles of integrative negotiation.

Because of producer–producer rivalry, the price will tend to   Multiple Choice   rise up to the maximum price the consumers are willing and able to pay.   be the same as the monopoly price.   be driven to a lower price.   be the same as the competitive price.

A Nash equilibrium with a noncredible threat as a component is   Multiple Choice   a subgame perfect equilibrium.   not a subgame perfect equilibrium.   a sequential equilibrium.   a somewhat subgame perfect equilibrium.