Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200−QA−QBP=200−QA−QB   where QAQA and QBQB, are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. The total cost functions for the two companies are TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2 TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2     Assume that the firms act independently as in the Cournot model (i.e., each firm assumes that the other firm’s output will not change). For Company A, the long-run equilibrium output is     and the selling price is    .   For Company B, the long-run equilibrium output is    , and the selling price is    .   At the equilibrium output, Company A earns total profits of     and Company B earns total profits of    . Therefore, the total industry profits are

There are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. The two firms’ products are viewed as identical by most consumers. The relevant cost functions are C(Q1) = 10 + 4Q1 and C(Q2) = 12 + 16Q2, and the market demand curve for product is given by P = 50 – 4Q. Instructions: Use no decimals. Use the average cost to calculate monopoly profits. Do not round values if used to complete other calculations. Complete the following table.   Q1 Q2 P Profits F1 Profits F2 Duopoly competition           Collusion

There are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for paving services is ?= 2040 ―20? where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price is measured in dollars per job. Assume Asphalt, Inc. has a marginal cost of $100 per driveway and Blacktop Bros. has a marginal cost of $150. Answer the following questions: Determine each firm’s reaction curve and graph it. How many paving jobs will each firm produce in Cournot equilibrium? What will the market price of a pave job be? How much profit does each firm earn?

Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200− Q A − Q B where Q A  and Q B  are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are TC A =1,500+55 Q A + Q A 2 TC B =1,200+20 Q B +2 Q B 2 Assume that the firms form a cartel to act as a monopolist and maximize total industry profits (sum of Firm A and Firm B profits). In such a case, Company A will produce    units and sell at   . Similarly, Company B will produce    units and sell at   . At the optimum output levels, Company A earns total profits of    and Company B earns total profits of   . Therefore, the total industry profits are   . At the optimum output levels, the marginal cost of Company A is    and the marginal cost of Company B is   . The following table shows the long-run equilibrium if the firms act independently, as in the Cournot model…

Q1: Firms A and B are two firms supplying products in two separate differentiated goods markets. Equations (1) and (2) give the total cost functions of the two firms:  - Firm A: TC = 2Q -----------------------------(1) - Firm B TC = 10 + 2Q -------------------------(2) Each firm has the ability to produce a maximum quantity of 80,000 units in ten batches of 8,000. Question : Use the information given above about firms A and B  and appropriate diagrams/figures to explain how the equilibrium for both firms will change if a rival company slashes its prices?

please explain in steps

Suppose the iceberg lettuce industry is a Cournot duopoly with two firms: Xtra Leafy (a) and Yummy Farms (y). Xtra Leafy produces q units of output and Yummy Farms produces qy units of output. Aggregate market output is Q = x + y. The (inverse) market demand schedule is: p = 176 - 2Q Both firms have identical cost structures: MC = MC₁ = ATC₂ = ATC₁ = $12 Find Xtra Leafy's Cournot reaction function of the form: 9x = a + bay Where "a" is the reaction function's intercept and "b" is its slope. Note: Please review the formatting instructions above. If any value is negative, be sure to include its negative sign. a. a= b. b = Hint: One of your answers will be negative. Think about why.

Q1: Firms A and B are two firms supplying products in two separate differentiated goods markets. Equations (1) and (2) give the total cost functions of the two firms:  - Firm A: TC = 2Q -----------------------------(1) - Firm B TC = 10 + 2Q -------------------------(2) Each firm has the ability to produce a maximum quantity of 80,000 units in ten batches of 8,000. Question: Explain and draw the relationship between the zero-profit curve and the marginal cost curve for the two firms using the quantity schedule of the two firms and the relevant plots of equations (1) and (2) ? *Please draw diagram and answer asap*

Q1: Firms A and B are two firms supplying products in two separate differentiated goods markets. Equations (1) and (2) give the total cost functions of the two firms:  - Firm A: TC = 2Q -----------------------------(1) - Firm B TC = 10 + 2Q -------------------------(2) Each firm has the ability to produce a maximum quantity of 80,000 units in ten batches of 8,000. Question:     Use the zero profit, marginal cost curve and isoprofit curves valuing $. 34,000 and $ 60,000 on both firms to assess whether the higher isoprofit curves would always get closer to the average cost curve as quantity increases. Explain why or why not?

b) Consider 2 firms, firm 1 and firm 2, who manufacture close but not perfect substitutes in the sense that the products are slightly differentiated. The demand curve for each firm is given by 91 = 1000-2P₁ + P₂ 92 = 1000-2P₂ + P₁ Their total cost functions are given as: TC₁ = 100q₁ TC₂ = 10092 i) ii) iii) iv) Determine the equilibrium price, output and profit for each firm assuming that they move simultaneously Determine the equilibrium price, output and profit for each firm assuming that firm 1 moves first and firm 2 afterwards Suppose the two firms collude, determine the equilibrium price, output and profit for each firm Construct a prisoner's dilemma scenario and determine the Nash equilibrium