4. Consider the job market signaling game given the figure below. The worker has two types: H and L, and q is the probability associated with type H. The production functions and indifference curves are as shown in the figure. In a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game, the range of values possible for equilibrium level of education, epool is (with an appropriate set of beliefs):

4. Consider the job market signaling game given the figure below. The worker has two types: H and L, and q is the probability associated with type H. The production functions and indifference curves are as shown in the figure. In a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game, the range of values possible for equilibrium level of education, epool is (with an appropriate set of beliefs):

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.10P

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