UB(2458Module Seven QuizAttempts2. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcomeZipride PricingSuppose that Zipride and Citron are the only two firms in a hypothetical market that produce and sell electric scootegives profit scenarios for each company (in millions of dollars), depending on whether it chooses to set a high or lowKeep the Highest / 5aHighLowCitron PricingHighLow11, 1118, 22, 18If Zipride prices high, Citron will make more profit if it chooses aa ▼ price.10, 10For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Zipride prices low and Citron prices high, Zipride will earn a profit of $1profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Zipride and Citron are both profit-maximizing firmsIf Citron prices high, Zipride will make more profit if it chooses aprice..TrueFalseConsidering all of the information given, pricing highIf the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?Q Search this courseO Both Zipride and Citron will choose a high price.O Zipride will choose a high price, and Citron will choose a low price.OZipride will choose a low price, and Citron will choose a high price.O Both Zipride and Citron will choose a low price.Xprice, and if Zipride prices low, Citron will maa dominant strategy for both Zipride and Citron.price, and if Citron prices low, Zipride will maTrue or False: The game between Zipride and Citron is not an example of the prisoners' dilemma.A-ZbongoA+O

Nash equilibrium is a situation in which each player chooses an optimal strategy given the strategy…

2. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose that Zipride and Citron are the only two firms in a hypothetical market that produce and sell electric scoote gives profit scenarios for each company (in millions of dollars), depending on whether it chooses to set a high or low Zipride Pricing High Low Citron Pricing High 11,11 18,2 Low 2,18 10, 10 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Ziprido

2. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose that Zipride and Citron are the only two firms in a hypothetical market that produce and sell electric scoote gives profit scenarios for each company (in millions of dollars), depending on whether it chooses to set a high or low Zipride Pricing High Low Citron Pricing High 11,11 18,2 Low 2,18 10, 10 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Ziprido

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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