13. In a repeated decision for which the present value of the benefits of cheating is less than the present value of the costs of cheating, deciding not to cheat is a value-maximizing decision. deciding to cooperate is a value-maximizing decision. deciding to cheat is a value-maximizing decision. both a and b b. C. d.

13. In a repeated decision for which the present value of the benefits of cheating is less than the present value of the costs of cheating, deciding not to cheat is a value-maximizing decision. deciding to cooperate is a value-maximizing decision. deciding to cheat is a value-maximizing decision. both a and b b. C. d.

Microeconomics: Principles & Policy

14th Edition

ISBN:9781337794992

Author:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Publisher:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Chapter13: Between Competition And Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10DQ

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Consider the following infinitely repeated game: 1/2 C D с 2,2 -3,3 D 3,-3-2,-2 a. Start with C and continue playing C as long as neither player deviates. If any player deviates, play D from that point onwards. For what value of the discount factor will this strategy be subgame perfect. b. Start with C, D and alternate between C,D and D,C. In case of deviation, play D,D forever. Can this strategy be subgame perfect?
3. Find the saddle point, if it exists, for the following game. (b) Solve the following game by using the principle of dominance and find the probabilities of strategies for each player and the value of the game. Player B Player A II III IV V 3 4 4 II 2 4 III 4 4 IV 4 4 20 2420 8760
4. Consider a bankruptcy game with two risk neutral players where V = $800,000, C1 = $300,000, and C2 = $800,000. a. What is the Nash bargaining solution? b. What is the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution?
10. Here's another game that has interested researchers, especially those of the type who work in the Max Gluskin House on campus at UofT. It's also a two-player game, but this time the payment is integral to describing the game. There is no direct Researcher involvement in the game, other than potentially as the source of a payout. For the sake of describing the game, imagine that Anson and Kanav are our two players and that they are playing the game virtually via Zoom for bitcoins, denoted B. There are always two piles of bitcoin in play: a larger one and a smaller one. Ahead of the game Anson and Kanav decide the maximum number 2n of turns, for some n E N greater than or equal to 1. • During the first turn the large pile of bitcoin has 4 Band the smaller pile of bitcoin has 1 B. Anson can either take the bitcoin or pass. If Anson (4 B) takes the bitcoin he gets the larger pile, Kanav gets the smaller pile (1 B) and the game ends. If he passes, the size of each pile is doubled. • Now…
Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) O Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 0 Player 2 Suppose the game is repeated infinitely many times, and 2 plays a grim trigger strategy (cooperates as long as 1 cooperates, but defects forever after 1 defects). What is the value of 1's future payoffs if 1 defects today and then best-responds to 2? Assume that the discount factor is still 0.5 (i.e. payoffs in the next period are worth half as much as payoffs today). 01 02 8 O 9 Defect (D) 0,8 1,1 If the game is repeated infinitely many times, what is the smallest discount factor that would support cooperation in Nash equilibrium? O 1/2 O 5/7 3/8
how do you do you find the expected payback for this problem? Find the expected payback for a game in which you bet $1010 on any number from 00 to 399.399. If your number comes up, you get $400400.
Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure. Consider the following two-player game where each player is given a set of cards and each card has a number on it. The players are Adi (Player 1) and Bani (Player 2). Adi’s cards have the following numbers (one number on each card): 2, 4 and 6, whereas Bani’s cards are marked 0, 1 and 2. Adi chooses one of her own cards and Bani chooses one of his own cards: this is done without knowing the other player’s choice. The outcome depends on the sum of the points of the chosen cards. If the sum of the points on the two chosen cards is greater than or equal to 5, Adi gets 10 minus that sum; otherwise (that is, if the sum is less than 5) she gets nothing; furthermore, if the sum of points is an odd number, Bina gets the sum; if the sum of points turns out to be an even number and is less than or equal to 6, Bina gets 2; otherwise…
5. Consider a general two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. How do we denote the subgame-perfect outcome? a. (a₁, až, až (α₁, A₂), A† (A₁, A2)) * b. (a₁, až, az (a₁, až), α₁ (a₁, až)) c. (a₁, a₂, a3 (a₁, A₂), α₁ (α₁, α₂)) d. * * * (a₁, až‚ až (aƒ‚ a₂), a‡ (aƒ‚ a²))
1. Each of two players simultaneously announces either Rock, Paper, or Scissors. Paper beats Rock, Rock beats Scissors, and Scissors beats Paper. The player who names the winning object receives $1 from her opponent. If both players make the same choice, no payment is made. Each players's preferences are represented by by the expected amount of money she receives. a) Formulate the situation as a strategic game and find all its mixed strategy equilibria. Make sure that you consider all different supports. b) Find all the mixed strategy equilibria of the modified game in which player 2 is prohibited from announcing Rock.
5. Consider the following game: L R 3,1 -2,-1 2,0 1,4 1 C 1,-1 D 0,-1 2,0 4,0 a. Find all pure NE. b. There is a unique MNE. Find it and show why there is no other one. c. Since the outcome (A, R) prescribes negative payoffs for both players, a natural conjecture might be to think that the following distribution over outcomes is a correlated equilibrium. Is it so? L R A 1/3 B 1/3 1/3 C D 2) A.
Consider an infinitely repeated game in which the following game is played in every stage. Players discount future payoffs with a factor of 8. Player 1 Fight Hug Fight 2,2 19,40 Player 2 Hug 40, 19 30, 30 If we want players to play (Hug. Hug) in every stage of a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, what is the lowest possible discount factor &? Round your answer to 2 decimal places.
The owner of the Jets is going to offer a contract to a free agent player, Hapoleon. If signed, Hapoleon can give the Jets high effort or low effort. High effort costs Hapoleon $2 million and low effort costs Hapoleon nothing. The Jets’ owner cannot observe Hapoleon’s effort directly. Hapoleon has a guaranteed offer of $10 million from another team, the Sharks. If Hapoleon signs with the Jets, the team can be profitable or not and the Jets’ owner can observe that. If Hapoleon gives high effort, then the probability the Jets are profitable is 80 percent, but if Hapoleon gives low effort, then the probability the Jets are profitable is 40 percent. Hapoleon is the typical risk neutral player and his utility is given by u w() = w . Calculate the optimal wage levels, wH and wL , that the Jets’ owner should offer Hapoleon to get him to sign with the Jets and give high effort if Hapoleon’s disutility from high effort increases to $3 million. Determine the optimal wage levels, wH and wL ,…