ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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1. How would you characterize the strategy for competing internationally that Ford was pursuing prior to the arrival of Alan Mulally in 2006? What were the benefits of this strategy? What were the costs? Why was Ford pursuing this strategy?
2. What strategy is Mulally trying to get Ford to pursue with his One Ford initiative? What are the benefits of this strategy? Can you see any drawbacks?
3. Does the One Ford initiative imply that Ford will now ignore national and regional differences in demand?
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