cans and charge 5 so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is S5 When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce information, each firm earns a daily profit of 5 per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Using the demand curve shown in the previous graph, find the price associated with this new total level of combined output (the price at which this new level of output would be purchased by consumers). Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to while McCovey's profit is now 5 Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. to S Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit per can. Mays's profit is now when

cans and charge 5 so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is S5 When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce information, each firm earns a daily profit of 5 per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Using the demand curve shown in the previous graph, find the price associated with this new total level of combined output (the price at which this new level of output would be purchased by consumers). Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to while McCovey's profit is now 5 Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. to S Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit per can. Mays's profit is now when

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Price MC 500 700 900 Quantity Five firms in an industry have equal and constant marginal costs and act as a cartel, with each firm agreeing to charge a price of $9. If they each sell an equal quantity of output, each firm will earn $ type your answer in revenue. If one firm decides to increase its quantity sold by 200 units, the cheating firms revenue will increase by $ type your anwer and the remaining firms will see tir total revenue decrease by $ type your anwwer.
All question are with regards to the following set up. There are two firms A and B. Firmscompete in a Cournot Duopoly in Karhide. They set quantities qA and qB. Inverse demand isP(qA + qB) = 18 − qA − qB and costs are C(q) = 3 ∗ q for both firms. Firm B is a domestic firm(in Karhide,) and firm A is a foreign firm (from Orgoreyn.) The government of Karhide engagesin a strategic trade intervention by giving firm B a per unit subsidy of s. (That is, when firm Bproduces and sells qB units, firm B receives a payment of s ∗ qB from the government.)You must show your work at each step, unless the questions is followed by ”No work required.” We now consider the government’s choice of s ≥ 0. We can see from above thatprofits and outputs depend upon s. With that in mind, let πB(s) and qB(s) denote firm B’s profitand output as a function of the subsidy s. Let qA(s) denote firm A’s equilibrium output as afunction of s. Let G(s) = πB(s) − s ∗ qB(s) denote the government’s objective function (d)…
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Please no written by hand solution Suppose two firms compete in quantities (Cournot). Market demand is given by P = 260 − 2Q, where Q = q1 + q2. Both firms have constant MC = AT C = 20.a. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium and find the Cournot equilibrium profits for each firm.b. Now suppose the two firms formed a cartel. What would be the profits for each firm then?c. If firm 2 sticks to the cartel agreement (quantity), then what is the best response for firm 1 (if firm 1 were to deviate)? Find the profits for firm 1 from deviating.d. How large must the probability-adjusted discount factor be in order for the cartel to be stable?e. How would the answer to part d. change if the two firms were competing in prices (Bertrand)?Please answer all steps, because no too much detailed answers required.
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Deviating from the collusive outcome Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MCMC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.60 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATCATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. table 1 When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce $____ cans and charge $______per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of $______, so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $_______.…
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