Irregular Warfare In The United States Marine Corps

The U.S. Marine Corps. Socialize their recruits through boot camp. In boot camp Marine’s are taught to command others with higher rank and proper authority. Physical training, weapon training, and drills are the main elements of training. During boot camp the marine is taught the main purpose is to

Out of my time in the Marine Corps I have come to notice that my though process has become almost autonomous. Many people know the Marine Corps has a strict command structure however, we operate using a very decentralized system. I would have to say that due to this my strongest characteristic would be Intellectual autonomy which is defined as willingness and ability to think for oneself. The ability to make decisions for my self and my Marines not only gives a more direct link and quicker reaction time to situations but it also allows my marines to grow confidence in the decisions I make. On the Battlefield my Marines and I are faced with taking a piece of key terrain (KT105) that could turn the tide of the fight. There are a number of enemy combatants between my squad and KT105. Although most of the enemy combatants are untrained they have a number of small arms and one machine gun nest posted 100m

Given the context of current strategic guidance, it is important to ask if the U.S. can be prepared to conduct both conventional and irregular warfare successfully. The answer is yes. However, preparation for conventional operations should always be the priority. Preparation for irregular warfare should not come at the expense of conventional warfare preparation. This is necessary because of the reasons discussed below: the strategic limitations of irregular warfare, the enduring nature of conventional war, resource constraints, and prioritization of operations and training.

This paper on Leadership will compare the primary differences and characteristics between the tactical leader and the organizational leader. I will provide you with the basics for development, characteristics, and the fundamentals that help guide and influence each leader’s style and how they influence Soldiers to follow them. Leaders at all levels demonstrate their values, knowledge, skills, and abilities in many different means and methods in

Leadership, according to the Army doctrine, represents individuals’ ability to influence people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization (“Leadership” FM 6-22). However, the varying characteristics of individuals that the Army attracts may instill this doctrine in many different ways, leading to different representations of leadership. Some individuals choose to lead their subordinate in a stern matter, only displaying matured emotions and a “tough-loving” attitude to guide them in the right direction. Others

-Loyalty:   Respect the Corps, and a leader’s Marines.   Leaders display their loyalty to their Marines by taking care of the Marines’ needs.

I agree that Unconventional Warfare (UW) activities support other Special Operations Core Activities. You did mentioned Military Information Support Operations (MISO) during the American Civil War accomplished by guerrilla fighters operating behind enemy lines spreading disinformation to the enemy about troop strength and dispositions, disrupted Federal supply and communication lines, and distracted contingents of troops. I find this interesting and I do wander what other Special Operation Core Activities were employed as well.

tradition and history, the United States Marine Corps has a robust structure, very unique culture,

R. Bolden et al (2003) discussed that the trait approach stemmed from the great man approach and that trait approach was common within the military and is still used as a set criteria today to commission candidates. It’s clear from the case study that Peter Ridge has quite a military style of leadership of command and control style. Bass (1981) stated that leadership is still classified as a critical factor in military success and has been continually recorded. Trait theories are qualities that are within a human being which constitutes a leader. Stogdill (1974) spoke about there being a list of leadership traits and related skills, he sees leaders as adaptable to situations, ambitious and achievement orientated, assertive, energetic,

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

In 1994, in the song Survival of the Fittest, Prodigy of the group Mobb Deep famously said, “There’s a war going on outside, no man is safe from”. That rang true then as it does today, and will echo for centuries to come. Though, because of evolution, you have to wonder if war changed. Today’s wars and wars of the past may appear different at first glance, but once dissected, they have more in common than seen. All wars require reason and emotion. Also, depending on the size of the opposition, whether it be a country, state or non-state actor, it is evident the requirement of the government, the people, and some sort of military also need to be in aligned to support the cause. With that in mind, the Marine Corps has now conducted counterinsurgency operations in the Middle Eastern countries of Iraq and Afghanistan for over two decades. In that time, we have learned that war has changed to a hybrid treat better known as Irregular Warfare. The role the Marine Corps will play in the future

According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, “it is often highlighted the US Marine Corps has not conducted an amphibious assault since the Korean War, although technically this is not true. The Marine Corps has conducted 4 amphibious assaults in just the last 2 decades.” (Emphasis added) Lt. General George Flynn argues that “in the past twenty years U.S. amphibious forces have responded to crises least one hundred and four times. These operations represent a crisis response rate more than double that of the Cold War.” (Emphasis added)

Dr Colin Grey, he asserts “that the United States should undertake little irregular warfare. It would be a political and strategic mistake to identify irregular warfare, COIN especially, as America’s dominant strategic future (Grey 1).” I disagree, I would assert that due to the United States’ superior military power and technology, more stable political system (democracy), and globally dominate economy, we can and will, be successful in COIN operations. Examining each of these pillars of power will illustrate the advantage the United States has already demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how these pillars will give us the strategic advantage in irregular

Though conventional and irregular warfare (IW) are both forms of warfare with the desired objective of affecting the opposition’s government, the means by which they achieve that objective differ greatly. A major war against a near-peer competitor would likely place the Marine Corps against another military superpower. Preparation for such a conflict would ideally focus on tactics suited for a conventional military. Meanwhile, preparing for success against an irregular threat would conversely focus on non-traditional and indirect means and skills intended to earn or degrade trust and support from the target population. As state and non-state actors place more emphasis on IW, preparation for success against irregular threats increases rather than undermines the Marine Corps’ ability to fight and win a major war against near-peer competitors.

Since a vast majority of wars over the last 100 years have been fought using the irregular warfare construct it would be extremely important for the US military to train and equip a sizable piece of the force to focus on fighting an irregular war. However, this does not negate the need to train and equip forces to fight a regular war. Our strategic policy should be to fully incorporate irregular warfare into our defense industrial complex to provide for the greatest coverage of war contingencies.