Consider an industry with two firms, each having marginal costs and total costs equal to zero. The industry demand is P = 100 − Q where Q = Q1 + Q2 is total output. 1. Find the cartel output and cartel profits assuming that the firms share the profit equally. In cartels, firms behave as if they are a monopoly. Hence, the cartel quantity is at the point where MR = MC. After finding the quantity, use the demand curve to find the cartel price. And then calculate Π = T R − T C. Divide the total profit by 2 to find each firm's profit.   2. If each firm behaves as a Cournot competitor, what is firm 1's optimal output given firm 2's output? This part is asking the best response function of firm 1. Solve firm 1's profit maximizatin problem by setting its MC = MR. Then, express Q1 as a function of Q2.   3. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium output and profit for each firm. You have already solved firm 1's problem above. Now solve firm 2's problem. Then, solve BR functions simultaneously to get…

Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. The average and marginal cost is €6 for each firm. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P = 30 – Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Suppose the two firms combine together and form a cartel. The output produced by each firm in the cartel is (assuming that they split the cartel output equally between them)    A. 6   B. 12   C. 8   D. 4     Two identical firms compete in a market to sell a homogenous good with the following inverse demand function: P = 600 – 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of €300 and there are no fixed costs. The price that each firm in the Cournot equilibrium will charge is     A. 400   B. 500   C. 300   D. 450

The table shows a hypothetical demand schedule for monosodium glutamate (MSG). Ajinomoto holds 5050% of the market, Jiali holds 3030% of the market, and Quingdao holds 2020% of the market. Suppose the three firms agree to form a cartel to fix production of monosodium glutamate. Assume marginal cost equals zero, and the output is split equally across the firms. What quantity maximizes the cartel's profit? Price of MSG ($ per pound) Quantity of MSG demanded (millions of pounds) $8$8 00 $7$7 2020 $6$6 3030 $5$5 4040 $4$4 6060 $3$3 9090 $2$2 110110 $1$1 180180 $0$0 300300   million pounds million pounds Suppose Ajinomoto's marginal cost remains equal to zero, but for Jiali and Quingdao, marginal costs rise above zero. How would this affect the incentive of Ajinomoto to act noncooperatively and change its output? Ajinomoto will not have an incentive to change its output. Ajinomoto will have an incentive to increase its output of MSG.…

Assume the management of two large firms selling canned vegetables hold a secret meeting to create a collusive cartel.  Which will most likely be the outcome of that meeting, assuming both companies engage in the collusion?     soda output will fall and market prices will fall   market price will remain unchanged and total output will fall   soda output will fall and market prices will rise   soda output will rise and market prices will fall   soda output will rise and market prices will rise

Suppose Farmer Smith from Kansas and Farmer Jones from Missouri agree to restrict their combined output of wheat in an attempt to increase the price and profits. How likely do you think the Smith–Jones cartel is to succeed? Explain.

The opioid epidemic causing a staggering number of deaths each year in the United States is largely caused by two drugs: heroin and fentanyl. Much of the heroin is supplied by several major organized Mexican cartels while the much stronger fentanyl is mostly produced in hundreds of labs (big and small) in China. The market structure for heroin can be considered as an oligopoly that operates as a monopoly. On the other hand, the fentanyl industry is less organized in terms of cartel organization and therefore more competitive. How do the differences in the organization of both industries explain why deaths from fentanyl have skyrocketed in recent years? The organized heroin cartel   A.does not have barriers to market entry. The more competitive fentanyl industry has substantial barriers to entry, making fentanyl a more available drug.   B.has the ability to control quantity and raise the prices. The more competitive fentanyl industry makes more of the drug available at a lower…

The graph below shows the demand for Cosmic shampoo. ◻ Suppose there are no fixed costs and marginal cost is a constant $30. a. What are the perfectly competitive price and output? Price: $ Output: b. What are the cartel (monopoly) price and output? Price: $ Output: c. If there are only four firms in the cartel, what are the price and output of each firm, assuming equal shares? Round your answers to 1 decimal place. Price: $ Output: Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.

Boulder has several ski and snowboard retailers that sell similar brands. Prices across these retails are relatively stable during preseason (ski/snowboard season) and midseason, but become volatile postseason. For the past few years, when one retailer slashed prices (especially postseason), other retailers followed suit. All retailers behave as oligopolists. Suppose that retailer A faces an inverse demand of p = 1,500 – 1.5Q, when the other retailers match retailer A’s price changes, and p=1200 – 0.7Q, when the other retailers don't match retailer A’s price changes. Suppose also that retailer A's cost function is C(Q) = 20,000 + 10Q + 0.8Q2. Question: Under these conditions, what is the most profit retailer A can make?

Suppose that a typical firm in a monopolistically competitive industry faces a demand curve given by: q = 60 − (1/2)p, where q is quantity sold per week. The firm’s marginal cost curve is given by: MC = 60. 1. How much will the firm produce in the short run? 2. What price will it charge? 3. Draw the firm’s demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost curves. Does this solution represent a long-run equilibrium? Why or why not?   Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Firm A) is large and the other firm (Firm B) is small, as shown in the prisoner’s dilemma box in Table 5.Firm B colludes with Firm AFirm B cheats by selling more outputFirm A colludes with Firm BA gets $1,000, B gets $100A gets $800, B gets $200Firm A cheats by selling more outputA gets $1,050, B gets $50A gets $500, B gets $20Assuming that the payoffs are known to both firms, what is the likely outcome in this case?