Question 3 Consider the following airline capacity allocation problem with buy-up. The total capacity is 100.There are three classes. All class demands follow normal distribution. The fare prices and demand statistics are given as follows: Class Fare Mean Std. Dev. 1 1000 17 6 2 900 45 15 3 500 90 20 Suppose that if a class 3 demand is rejected booking, each individual has a probability of 0.3 to become a class 2 demand; and if a class 2 demand is rejected booking, each individual has a probability of 0.2 to become a class 1 demand. The airline company needs to determine the nested protection levels. Use @risk simulation optimization tofind the optimal decisions. (Please round all the simulated numbers and solutions to the nearest integer.)

In Akerlof’s market for lemons model, suppose it is possible to certify cars, verifying that they are better than a particular quality q. Thus, a market for cars “at least as good as q” is possible. What price or prices are possible in this market? [Hint: sellers offer cars only if q ≤ quality ≤ p.] What quality maximizes the expected gains from trade?

An individual has the utility function U(I) = I^(1/2), where I is their net income. (Note that I to the exponent/power of 1/2 is the same as the square root of I.) The individual starts with $1600 in income. The individual has a 20% probability of being very sick, 30% probability of being slightly sick, and 50% probability of being healthy. If the individual is sick, they lose net income because they need to pay healthcare costs. The healthcare costs are $1600 if they are very sick, $700 if they are slightly sick, and $0 if they are healthy. Please use this information for the following parts of this question unless otherwise specified.   What is the individual's expected utility?   Suppose a health insurance company offers the individual a full insurance contract. What is the actuarially fair, full insurance premium for this individual?   What is the individual's expected utility if they purchase a full insurance contract at the actuarially fair, full insurance premium?

Multiple Choice   Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss.   Adverse selection occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured. This can happen, for example, when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks.   The relationship between smoking status and mortality provides a good illustration for adverse selection, especially in the case in which a life insurance company did not vary its premiums according to smoking status of its customers.   To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers may offer premiums that are proportional to a customer's risk.

Who   detected   the   endowment   effect   first?   Tell   us   about   the   design   of   the  experiment   and   its   main   conclusions.

Could you please answer part C? What will Celia’s first-order condition be in step 1? Your answer should bean expression that involves D

What happens when we reverse the information assumptions in the Akerlof model? Let us assume that buyers have perfect information about car quality and that sellers have no information about the quality of any specific car (although they do know the distribution of car quality). Assume that all other basic assumptions apply as usual, including the buyer and seller utility functions (equation (8.1)). a. Explain how these information assumptions might be possible in certain circumstances. What sorts of goods would likely have markets that feature these counter-intuitive assumptions? b. Imagine that you are a car seller who owns car i with quality Xi (unknown to you). What strategy could you pursue to sell the car in such a way that your utility increases? c.  Does adverse selection occur in this market?

Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages.   Under a negligence standard, what is…

Use the following information for questions 12-14. Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages toV. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages.   Under a negligence standard, what are…