Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337106665
Author: Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 18, Problem 3MC
To determine
Winning bid.
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If some auction participants for crude-oil field leases have estimates that the oil in the ground is worth $1.2 million, $1.3 million, or $1.5 million with certainty; other auction participants have estimates that the same oil field lease is worth $1.1 million, $1.3 million, or $1.5 million with certainty; and a third group of auction participants have estimates that the same oil field lease is worth $1.1 million, $1.2 million, or $1.3 million, and all three forecasts contain the true common value, what is that value? How would you as auctioneer-seller design an auction to reduce strategic underbidding and realize this true value?
Say that you are bidding in a sealed-bid auction and that you really want the item being auctioned. Winning it would be worth $500 to you. Say you expect the next-highest bidder to bid $300.a. In a standard “highest-bid” auction, what bid would a rational person make?
The rational choice is to bid $500 since that is what the item is worth to you.
The rational choice is to bid a little bit more than $300 because that is the expected next-highest bid.
The rational choice is to bid just under $500 so that you have a higher chance of winning the auction and would still have a net benefit.
The rational choice is to bid over $500 to guarantee that you win the item.
b. In a Vickrey auction, what bid would he make?
The rational choice is to bid slightly more than $500.
The rational choice is to bid $500.
The rational choice is to bid slightly less than $500.
The rational choice is to bid slightly more than $300.
At an oral auction for a lamp, half of all bidders
have a value of $50 and half have a value of $70.
What is the expected winning bid if there are four
bidders?
Chapter 18 Solutions
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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Similar questions
- Consider the following situation: five individuals are participating in an auction for an old bicycle used by a famous cyclist. The table below provides the bidders' valuations of the cycle. The auctioneer starts the bid at an offer price far above the bidders' values and lowers the price in increments until one of the bidders accepts the offer. Bidder Value ($) Roberto 750 Claudia 700 Mario 650 Bradley 600 Michelle 550 What is the optimal strategy of each player in this case? Who will win the auction if each bidder places his or her optimal bid? If Claudia wins the auction, how much surplus will she earn?arrow_forward4. A uniform price auction is an auction where all the winners pay the same price. A k-th price auction is an auction where the price paid by the winner(s) is the k-th highest bid. We run a 3rd price, uniform price auction for two items, so the winners are the two bidders with the highest bid. There are 4 bidders, A, B, C and D, and they bid respectively $10, $9, $8 and $12. (A) Bidders A and B win the auction and pay $9. (B) Bidders A and D win the auction and pay $9. (C) Bidders B and D win the auction and pay $10. (D) Bidders B and C win the auction and pay $8.arrow_forwardConsider the payoff matrix listed below: IS |1, -1 3, 0 |2, 1 0, 3 1, 2 |0, 0 3, 1 5, 3 2, 1 What is the Nash Equilibium of the game? a. (B, R) b. (U, Q) c. (B, S) d. (C, Q) M/2/6arrow_forward
- Refer to the following payoff table: Firm A's Advertising Budget Low Multiple Choice Medium High A D G $900, $900 Low $1,000, $800 Firm A High; Firm B Low Firm A Low; Firm B Low Firm B's Advertising Budget Medium B E H $820, $1,220 $950, $1,025 с F 1 High $875, $920 $800, $875 $1,025, $1,175 Using the method of successive elimination of dominated strategies, which strategies, if any, are eliminated after the first round? $1,060, $1,100 $1,040, $1,000arrow_forwardYour company is bidding for mineral rights to a tract of land for drilling oil. Based on your geological survey reports, your valuation of the mineral rights is $38 million. You believe the distribution of bids will be uniform for the mineral rights, with a high value of $45 million and a low value of $20 million. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, how much should you for bid if there are 5 bidders? a. $41.40 Million O b. $45.00 Million Oc. $38.00 Million O d. $34.40 Millionarrow_forwardPlayer 2 Strategy A Strategy B Player 1 Strategy A 3, 3 2, 2 Strategy B 2, 2 1, 1 a) Is A an evolutionary stable strategy? How do you know? b) Is B an evolutionary stable strategy? How do you know? c) Is there any mixed strategy that places positive probability on B that could be an evolutionary stable strategy? How do you know?arrow_forward
- Explain why a player in a sealed-bid, second-price auction would never submit a bid that exceeds his or her true value of the object being sold. (Hint: What if all players submitted bids greater than their valuations of the object?)arrow_forward7arrow_forwardWhat amount does each bidder bid in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a 2nd price auction? O The expected value of the second highest bidder. One half of the expected value of the second highest bidder. Their own value. One half of their own value.arrow_forward
- Don't copy and don't paste give wee new answerarrow_forwardThe above table shows the payoffs that either Darrin or Rob receive depending on whether they choose a high or a low price strategy. The predicted outcome is A. Darrin - Low Price; Rob - Low Price. B. Darrin - Low Price; Rob - High Price. C. Darrin - High Price; Rob - Low Price. D. Darrin - High Price; Rob - High Price.arrow_forward1arrow_forward
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