Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 16, Problem 11E
To determine
To calculate: The outcome supposing that the latter’s payoff in the southwest cell is positive, and also the playing strategy of the company in the modified licensing game.
Expert Solution & Answer
Trending nowThis is a popular solution!
Students have asked these similar questions
Two car manufacturers, Nissa and Honda, have fixed costs of $1 billion and marginal costs of $10,000 per car. If Nissan produces 500,000 cars per year and Honda produces 200,000 cars per year, calculate the average production cost for each company.Average production cost for Nissan: $ .Average production cost for Honda: $ .On the basis of these costs, which company's market share do you think will grow in relative terms? Honda or Nissan?
Do an economic analysis of two giant competitor brands, Coke and Pepsi, in the context of them being rivals in the Twenty-First Century and use all the knowledge you have gathered over the last several weeks. Please do not make it a financial case. It is to be an economics case study, utilizing the economic model of pure competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly or monopoly.
3.1 Do either of the two telecommunications firms have a dominant strategy in this interaction?If so, what are these dominant strategies?
3.2 What is the Nash Equilibrium of the game above? Clearly, show the logic you use to reachyour conclusion. What type of game is this?
3.3 Suppose the two firms could incentivize or punish each other, could the two firms find theirway to the socially optimum outcome? How would they do this?
After observing the strategic interaction between Globogym and Average Joe’s, the governmentdecides to pass a law that states that the two terms must pre-commit to the quantities of trainingsessions they will supply to the American market.Market demand for training sessions is still modeled as ? = 400 − 0.2?, as before, and the marginalcost of production is constant at R40 per call. Let the number of sessions provided by Globogym berepresented by ?G and the quantity provided by Average Joe’s be represented by ?A.
3.4 Solve the firms’ reaction functions and…
Chapter 16 Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- It may seem as though basic static games are too simple to describe the strategic choices faced by modern transnational firms. Yet simple normal-form games apply to the case studies presented in both of the textbooks. Present your observation of what many of these cases have in common. This is your rule category. Point out the cases that are exceptions, if any, and why you think they are different from the others. This is your exception category. In response to your classmates' posts, explain what circumstances would have to change to move a case from the rule category to the exception category, or vice versa.arrow_forwardAssume that the market for oil is made up of two firms: Exxon Mobil and Chevron. Also assume that New England has dozens of breweries and each of these make beers with different tastes, colors, and aromas. Which of the following statements is true? The market structure for oil is an oligopoly, and the one for beer is monopolistic competition. The market structure for oil is monopolistic competition, and the one for beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is monopolistic competition.arrow_forwardConsider a two-player game between Child's Play and Kid's Corner, each of which produces and sells swing sets for children. Each player can set either a high or a low price for a standard two-swing, one-slide set. If they both set a high price, each receives profits of $64,000 per year. If one sets a low price and the other sets a high price, the low-price firm earns profits of $72,000 per year, while the high-price firm earns $20,000. If they both set a low price, each receives profits of $57,000. Assume also that the annual discount rate is r = 25%, or 8 = 0.8. The price-setting game in each year could be represented in the following normal form: CP (row)/ KC (column) High Price Low Price Game between CP and KC High Price 64, 64 72, 20 Low Price 20, 72 57, 57 a) What is the stage equilibrium of the prisoners' dilemma between CP and KC? i.(L,H) ii. (H,L) iii. (L,L) iiii. (H,H) b) What is the cooperative strategy profile? i.(L,H) ii. (H,L) iii. (L,L) iiii. (H,H) c) Suppose we repeated…arrow_forward
- 10:04 PM cb = Chegg Economics Vo LTE expert.chegg.com/expertqna Time remaining: 00:09:49 Consider the following payoff matrix for two oligopolists that are deciding what quantity to produce: Firm 2 High Quantity Low Quantity $70k; $70k $130k; $20k High Quantity Firm 1 $20k; $130k $100k; $100k Low Quantity In the Nash equilibrium of this game, what are the payoffs to each firm? O a. Firm 1 receives $130k and Firm 2 receives $20k. O b. Firm 1 receives $20k and Firm 2 receives $130k. O c. Firm 1 receives $100k and Firm 2 receives $100k. O d. Firm 1 receives $70k and Firm 2 receives $70k. Answer Skip 4G Exit 2 ¹20%arrow_forward5) Use a supply and demand diagram like in the slide titled "From monopoly to Cournot duopoly" to explain conceptually the supply decision that leads to a Cournot Nash equilibrium, and why it has lower price and total profits than the collusive (monopoly) supply. Optionally you can also use precise numbers: assume market demand behaves like P=36-3Q, (Q=Q1 +Q2), and the constant marginal cost is MC=18, then solve for price and profits, both under collusion and Cournot competition. Hint: you will need to solve for each oligopolist's supply decision contingent on that of the other, so-called best-response functions. You may consult the Perloff excerpt for the individual steps.arrow_forwardThis exercise related to a game theory P 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 QD 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 Consider a market with the above demand and two firms. Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 7. 1. What price should these firms charge to maximize total industry profit? (Note: the marginal condition we learned will work here but you need to be careful because the changes in quantity on the schedule are not 1. Because of this, you might want to use a brute force approach here. It's worth thinking about how you would reconcile it with the marginal condition though. Also, the marginal condition doesn't match exactly so take the best number from the schedule.)......... 2. Assuming that if they set the same price, they split the market evenly, what will the profit of each firm be if they both set the above…arrow_forward
- Given the information on the preceding graph, use the blue line (circle symbol) to graph the demand curve for the dominant firm (also known as the residual demand curve) and the black line (plus symbol) to graph the marginal revenue curve for the dominant firm on the following graph. (Hint: The slope of the marginal revenue curve is twice that of the demand curve since the demand curve is linear in this case.) Price (Dollars per box of cereal) 20 0 D MC of Dominant Firm 20 40 60 80 10 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 QUANTITY (Millions of boxes of cereal per year) DF Demand Marginal Revenue This graph also shows the dominant firm's marginal cost curve. Given that cost curve, as well as the demand and marginal revenue curves you derived, the price of a box of cereal will be $ under the price leadership model.arrow_forwardExplain how strategic alliances are a substitute for exploiting economies of scope in diversification.arrow_forward11. Suppose there is a duopoly of two identical firms, A and B, facing a market inverse demand of P = 140 – 0.5Q, and cost functions of CA = 20QA and Cg = 20QB respectively. a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and profit for each firm. b. Suppose that A acts as the leader in a Stackelberg model and B responds. What are the respective quantities and profits of each firm now? Is it advantageous to move first? c. If the firms were able to collude, how much additional profit could they earn if they switch from simple single pricing to perfect price discrimination? d. Graph and label equilibria on the inverse demand.arrow_forward
- Consider the argument: Price-match guarantees are bad for consumers because they eliminate any incentive for competitors to reduce prices. When you think it through, it's obvious that they eliminate price competition; ACME wouldn't win any of Globex's customers by offering a discount if Globex will give the same discount. The argument is extended; that is, there's a main argument and an argument for one of the premises. What is the main conclusion? O ACME wouldn't win any of Globex's customers by offering a discount if Globex will give the same discount. o Ensuring that customers will pay the lowest available price is good for consumers. O Price-match guarantees eliminate any incentive for competitors to reduce prices. O Price-match guarantees are bad for consumers.arrow_forwardI am intrigued by the following article detailing how Nestle agreed to pay Starbucks $7.2B to distribute and sell Starbucks’ packaged coffees and teas around the world. Why would Nestle purposely put its competitors’ brands right next to it in the store, and then pay them for the privilege? Why wouldn’t Starbucks just take care of distributing its own brands rather than go through Nestle? Please explain how this outcome could be profit maximizing for both firmsarrow_forwardJapan and Germany have very well-developed automobile industries but have productivity differences across firms. The market structure for the automobile industry is monopolistically competitive because it is characterized by increasing returns to scale technology. The productivity difference takes the form of c = 1/phi where a more productive firm has a higher phi, therefore a lower marginal cost, c. Can you derive the price charged and the average cost of such a firm, in autarky? Now, let the PP and the AA curves be true for average price and average AC in the industry. After trade opens, if the average price falls, can you compare and show what is happening to a firm with the highest phi and the one with the lowest phi? Give answer with graph.arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
- Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...EconomicsISBN:9781305506381Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. HarrisPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:Cengage Learning