Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 15, Problem 9E
To determine
To ascertain: The differing in the optimal incentives contract supposing that the less risk-averse bank offer has earned considerable smaller anticipated profit.
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BPO Services is in the business of digitizing information from forms that are filled out by hand. In 2006, a big client gave BPO a distribution of the forms that it digitized in house last year, and BPO estimated how much it would cost to digitize each form.
Form Type
Mix of Forms
Form Cost
A
0.5
$3.00
B
0.5
$1.00
The expected cost of digitizing a form is
.
Suppose the client and BPO agree to a deal, whereby the client pays BPO to digitize forms. The price of each form processed is equal to the expected cost of the form that you calculated in the previous part of the problem.
Suppose that after the agreement, the client sends only forms of type A.
The expected digitization cost per form of the forms sent by the client is
. This leads to an expected loss of
per form for BPO. (Hint: Do not round your answers. Enter the loss as a positive number.)
Suppose you play a game with a spinner. You play each game by spinning the spinner once. P(red) = P(blue) = Ķ, and P(green) = . If you land on red, you pay 10 pesos. If you land on blue, you don't pay or win anything. If you land on green, you win 10 pesos. What is the expected profit of the game?
Economics
CHOOSE THE CORRECT ANSWER.
Remember that in the equilibrium prediction of an
ultimatum game, the Proposer will offer the
smallest non-zero amount of money possible.
First-year Commerce students were asked to play an Ultimatum game where a choice had to be made over the division of R100. Offers could only be
made in R10 increments, and the results of the various offers made are reported in the table below.
Amount offered by Proposer
RO
R10
R20
R30
R40
R50
Proportion rejected
100%
60%
50%
30%
10%
0%
What is the equilibrium split of the R100 between the Proposer and the Responder?
O A. Proposer: R50, Responder: R50
O B. Proposer: R10, Responder: R90
O C. Proposer: R90, Responder: R10
O D. Proposer: R60, Responder: R40
O E. Proposer: R40, Responder: R60
Chapter 15 Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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