ECONOMICS W/CONNECT+20 >C<
20th Edition
ISBN: 9781259714993
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG CUSTOM
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Question
Chapter 14, Problem 1P
To determine
The punishment strategy for the cheating firm.
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Consider a “punishment” variation of the two-firm oligopoly situation shown in Figure 14.1. Suppose that if one firm sets a low price while the other sets a high price, then the firm setting the high price can fine the firm setting the low price. Suppose that whenever a fine is imposed, X dollars is taken from the low-price firm and given to the high-price firm. What is the smallest amount that the fine X can be such that both firms will want to always set the high price?
2
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with n = 2 firms. Firm 1 cost function is TC₁ (9₁) = 20 + 12q₁ + q²,
while firm 2 cost function is TC₂ (9₂) = 50 +8q2 + q2 . The total market demand is P(Q) = 50 — 2Q,
where Q is the total quantity produced by all (active) firms in the industry.
a- Compute the Cournot equilibrium total quantity, price, quantity for each firm, and profit for
each firm. Which firm is making higher profits?
b- Consider the situation in which a third firm (firm 3) enters the market. What is the total
equilibrium quantity, price, quantity and profit for each firm if TC3 = TC₁? [hint: q₁ and q3 will
be the same, since 1 and 3 are identical]
c- How would your answer at point b change if instead TC3 = TC₂? Would consumers prefer firm
3 to enter with the total cost of firm 1 or firm 2?
d- What would be the highest one-time cost that firm 3 would be willing to pay to enter the
market and then compete in a Cournot game with total cost equal to firm 1?
Chapter 14 Solutions
ECONOMICS W/CONNECT+20 >C<
Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 1QQCh. 14.2 - The D2e segment of the demand curve D2eD1 graph...Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 3QQCh. 14.2 - Prob. 4QQCh. 14 - Prob. 1DQCh. 14 - Prob. 2DQCh. 14 - Prob. 3DQCh. 14 - Prob. 4DQCh. 14 - Prob. 5DQCh. 14 - Prob. 6DQ
Ch. 14 - Prob. 7DQCh. 14 - Prob. 8DQCh. 14 - Prob. 9DQCh. 14 - Prob. 10DQCh. 14 - Prob. 11DQCh. 14 - Prob. 12DQCh. 14 - Prob. 13DQCh. 14 - Prob. 14DQCh. 14 - Prob. 1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 5RQCh. 14 - Prob. 6RQCh. 14 - Prob. 7RQCh. 14 - Prob. 8RQCh. 14 - Prob. 9RQCh. 14 - Prob. 10RQCh. 14 - Prob. 1PCh. 14 - Prob. 2PCh. 14 - Prob. 3P
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- Consider a "punishment" variation of the two-firm oligopoly situation shown in the figure below. Suppose that if one firm sets a low price while the other sets a high price, then the firm setting the high price can fine the firm setting the low price. Suppose that whenever a fine is imposed, X dollars are taken from the low-price firm and given to the high-price firm. RareAir's price strategy High Low $12 $15 A B High $12 $6 $6 $8 Low $15 $8 Instructions: Enter your answer as a whole number. What is the smallest amount that the fine X can be such that both firms will want to always set the high price? $O million Uptown's price strategyarrow_forwardSuppose the inverse demand for a particular good is given by P = 1200-12Q. Furthermore, there are only two firms, A and B. Firm A's marginal cost is a constant $25, and Firm B's marginal cost is a constant $20. Assume these two firms engage in Cournot competition. If we assume that the firm with the lowest costs could supply the entire market, then the deadweight loss due to the market power these two firms exert through Cournot competition equals $. 4 [Round your answer to the nearest two decimals.]arrow_forwardConsider the following statements about the Stackelberg game from the slides, assuming both firms are identical: (I) Denote by qC the Cournot equilibrium quantity produced by each firm, and by qPC the competitive quantity defined by P(qPC) = c (price equals marginal cost). Let s2 denote a strategy where firm 2 plays q2 = qC if it observes q 1 = qC, and plays q2 = qPC otherwise. Let s 1 denote a strategy where firm 1 plays q1 = qC. Then, (s1,s2) is a Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, but it’s not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (II) The first firm is allowed to change its quantity after observing firm 2’s quantity chosen at the second stage. (III) Consumers are worse off in the Stackelberg game compared with the Cournot outcome given the same parameters. Group of answer choices: a. Only II is correct b. Only I is correct. c. All options are incorrect. d. Only III is correct e. More than one option is correct.arrow_forward
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