You are the manager of a monopolistically competitive firm, and your demand and cost functions are estimated as Q = 25 – ½P and C = Q² + 2Q + 2. What is the firm's maximum profit? -

A shoe store in a monopolistically competitive market has a demand curve for their shoes given by P = 81-0.5Q. The variable costs of producing a shoe are given by the equation VC = Q2 + 3Q and so the marginal costs are MC = 20 +3. a) What is the shoe store's profit - maximizing output and price? If the shoe store is in a long-run equilibrium, what must its fixed costs be?

a)  Suppose that the two firms engage in Cournot competition. Find the equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the profits πANE and πBNE, for each firm. b)  Suppose the marginal cost for firm B increases from $20 to $140, while everything else remains unchanged. Find the new equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the new equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the new profits πANE and πBNE for each firm. c)  Suppose that, in addition to the marginal cost increase from $20 to $140 from sub question b), firm B also has a fixed cost of $2500, out of which $2100 may be recouped if it shuts down; everything else remains unchanged. In this case, what will firm B’s optimal output be? (Justify your answer.) What will firm A’s profit be?

There are two ice-cream parols on a beach. The dayly demand for ice-creams is given by Q = 3079 - 3p. The average variable cost of an ice-cream is 70, while the rent of the place is 966. How many ice-creams is the 'Leader' company selling if the two ice-cream stands operate as Stackelberg duopolists? (Please use 2 decimals in your answer.)

Suppose that firm Alphabet is the only company that sells all-inclusive vacation packages in the UK. It faces two markets with demand curves given by P₁ = 200 - Q₁ and P₂ = 100-Q2. Assume that Alphabet's total cost function is C = 400 + 200 1) What is the market structure of the all-inclusive vacation packages in the UK? Is firm Alphabet a price taker or price maker? Explain. 2) If Alphabet can price discriminate and could tell which consumer belongs to which market before the purchase happens, what is the type of price discrimination that Alphabet is practising? Explain. Give another example of the same type of price discrimination. 3) If Alphabet can charge different prices at those two markets, what price should it charge in each market in order to maximise profits? What are the quantities it should produce in each market? 4) What if he cannot price discriminate? Then what price should he charge? What is the quantity produced?

There are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for paving services is ?= 2040 ―20? where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price is measured in dollars per job. Assume Asphalt, Inc. has a marginal cost of $100 per driveway and Blacktop Bros. has a marginal cost of $150. Answer the following questions: Determine each firm’s reaction curve and graph it. How many paving jobs will each firm produce in Cournot equilibrium? What will the market price of a pave job be? How much profit does each firm earn?

A firm in a monopolistically competitive market faces the following demand curve:   Q(P)=2,223-57P   Its total cost function is:   TC(Q) = $ 15(Q) + $1208   Calculate the profit maximizing quantity

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Eric owns a plot of land in the desert that isn't worth much. One day, a giant meteorite falls on his property, making a large crater. The event attracts scientists and tourists, and Eric decides to sell nontransferable admission tickets to the meteor crater to both types of visitors: scientists (Market A) and tourists (Market B). The following graphs show daily demand (DD) curves and marginal revenue (MRMR) curves for the two markets. Eric's marginal cost of providing admission tickets is zero. PRICE (Dollars per ticket) 20 18 16 9 09 2 0 0 1 Market A MR 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 QUANTITY (Admission tickets) Pricing Policy Nondiscriminatory Discriminatory D 0 10 Total Revenue (Dollars) PRICE (Dollars per ticket) 20 18 18 14 12 10 8 4 2 0 0 1 low Market B Imagine that at first, Eric charges the same price of $8 per admission in both markets so that the total number of admissions demanded is Tickets. Imagine now that Eric decides to charge a different price in each market. To maximize revenue, Eric…

Economics: Industrial Economics Question: In a market operating under quantity competition there are 2 firms (Cournot duopoly). The cost structure of firm 1 is given by C1(q1) = 675 + 60q1 + (q1)^2 and that of firm 2 is given by C2(q2) = 375 + 20 q2 + 5 (q2)^2. The inverse demand function is P = 300 - 2 Q1, where Q = q1 + q2.   Define the profit maximization problem that every firm faces and solve for the respective best response functions. Use these (or the first order condition directly) to answer the following: 1. The Nash Equilibrium quantity produced by firm 1 q1* is Choices: A. 33.3 B. 38.3 C. 40 D. 35   2. The Nash Equilibrium quantity produced by firm 2 q2* is Choices: A. 15 B. 53.3 C. 20 D. 21.7   3. The Nash Equilibrium price is Choices: A. 126.7 B. 180 C. 200 D. 190   4. The Lerner Index for the market is closest to Choices: A. 0.29 B. 0.66 C. 0.43 D. 0.57   Thank you for your help and support Instructor Agent!