
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Transcribed Image Text:The following payoff matrix represents a simultaneous-move game between two players: John and Trevor. Each player has to choices:
Black or White. The first number in each cell is the payoff to John, and the second number is the payoff to Trevor.
Trevor
Black
White
Black
15, 15
10, 10
John
White
12, 10
13, 15
Refer to the table above. Which statement is true?
a. Neither John nor Trevor have a dominant strategy in this game.
b. Only Trevor has a dominant strategy in this game.
c. Only John has a dominant strategy in this game.
d. John and Trevor both have a dominant strategy in this game.
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