The following payoff matrix represents a simultaneous-move game between two players: John and Trevor. Each player has to choices: Black or White. The first number in each cell is the payoff to John, and the second number is the payoff to Trevor. Trevor Black White Black 15, 15 10, 10 John White 12, 10 13, 15 Refer to the table above. Which statement is true? a. Neither John nor Trevor have a dominant strategy in this game. O b. Only Trevor has a dominant strategy in this game. c. Only John has a dominant strategy in this game.

The following payoff matrix represents a simultaneous-move game between two players: John and Trevor. Each player has to choices: Black or White. The first number in each cell is the payoff to John, and the second number is the payoff to Trevor. Trevor Black White Black 15, 15 10, 10 John White 12, 10 13, 15 Refer to the table above. Which statement is true? a. Neither John nor Trevor have a dominant strategy in this game. O b. Only Trevor has a dominant strategy in this game. c. Only John has a dominant strategy in this game.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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