Which of the following statement(s) is/are true? Bidding more than your valuation is weakly dominated in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. Bidding less than your valuation is weakly dominated in a first-price, sealed- bid auction. O None of the other statements are true. Bidding more than your valuation is weakly dominated in a first-price, sealed-bid auction. Bidding less than your valuation is weakly dominated in a second-price, sealed-bid auction.

4. An auctioneer holds a second-price auction for two bidders, Ann (A) and Bonnie (B), who have independent private values of the good 0, and 0g If a bidder wins, her payoff is her value 0 minus the price she pays, and if she loses, her payoff is 0. The values are independently and identically distributed, but otherwise you don't need to know the specific distributions to solve the problem. Ann and Bonnie's respective strategies are to bid some value b0), that is, bid given their privately-known value (type). e. Suppose the good had one true value for both bidders equal to the average of 0, and e, (signals that are still i.i.d.); hence, the good's true value has a common component. Suppose Ann knows Bonnie is going to bid her own evaluation 0, no matter what, but like normal, Ann doesn't know 0g. Explain why bidding 0, is now a strictly dominated strategy for Ann.

Two competing firms are each planning to introduce a new product. Each will decide whether to produce Product A, Product B, or Product C. They will make their choices at the same time. The resulting payoffs are shown to the right. Are there any Nash equilibria in pure strategies? If so, then what are they? O A. The Nash equilibria are for both firms to introduce Product B and for both firms to introduce Product A. O B. The Nash equilibria are for Firm 1 to introduce Product B and Firm 2 to introduce Product C and for Firm 1 to introduce Product C and Firm 2 to introduce Product B. O C. The Nash equilibria are for Firm 1 to introduce Product A and Firm 2 to introduce Product B and for Firm 1 to introduce Product B and Firm 2 to introduce Product A. O D. The Nash equilibria are for Firm 1 to introduce Product A and Firm 2 to introduce Product C and for Firm 1 to introduce Product C and Firm 2 to introduce Product A. There are no Nash equilibria. O E. If both firms use maximin strategies,…

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