Consider a market with demand p(q) = 10 - q. There are infinitely many firms that could enter this market, numbered i = 1, 2,..., o. The game proceeds in two stages. 1 The firms simultaneously decide whether to enter the market or not. At the end of this stage, all firms observe which firms entered. 2 The firms that entered simultaneously choose their quantities. Each firm that enters must pay a fixed entry cost of F = 2. Each firm that enters then may produce any quantity at zero cost. The firms' products are all identical. We will find a subgame perfect equilibrium in this game using backward induction.

Please no written by hand and no emage

question part c should contain a graph

A doctor's office staff studied the waiting times for patients who arrive at the office with a request for emergency service. The following data with waiting times in minutes were collected over a one- month period. a. Fill in the frequency values below. Waiting Time Frequency 49 11 16 4 2 3 18 11 7 9 8 12 24 7 8 7 13 19 5 4 0-4 5-9 8 4 10-14 15-19 3 20-24 1 Total 20 b. Fill in the relative frequency (2 decimals) values below. Waiting Time Relative Frequency 0.2 0-4 5-9 0.4 0.2 10-14 15-19 0.15 20-24 0.05 Total 1