Use the photo at exercise 14 to solve the problem below  With the Firm Y response function Qy=600-1/2Qx and the Firm X response function Qx=600-1/2Qy  Imagine that firm X chooses their quantity first, then firm Y observes the quantity of firm X and chooses their own quantity.  What quantities will they end up choosing?  Is there a first or second-mover advantage here?

Assume the inverse demand function in a market is given by P(Q) = 500 - Q where Q is the total industry output, that is the sum of the output of all firms in the market. There are two firms (indexed by i = 1,2) who both have a cost of producing the good given by c(qi) = 10 * qi The two firms are competing in the Cournot manner, that is they choose their quantities simultaneously in order to maximize profits.

After talking your managerial economics class, you realize that you can probably raise your profits by price discriminating by charging different prices in the two locations.  You then breakdown sales across the two locations In Laredo:  You sold 200 burger meals per week at $9 and 100 meals at $10 In San Antonio:  You sold 1200 meals per week at $9 and 1100 meals at $10 Using the two prices above, estimate your demand function in Laredo. What would demand be at the optimal price from Q1? Using the two prices above, estimate your demand function in San Antonio. What would demand be at the optimal price from Q1? Calculate the point price elasticity of demand at the optimal price for Q1 (and quantity from part A) in Laredo Calculate the point price elasticity of demand at the optimal price for Q1 (and quantity from part B) in San Antonio Assuming that your marginal costs are $3, are you charging more, less, or exactly the optimal price in Laredo Hint: Calculate the markup on price and…

The quantity of a product demanded by consumers is a function of its price. The quantity of one product demanded may also depend on the price of other products. For example, if the only chocolate shop in town (a monopoly) sells milk and dark chocolates, the price it sets for each affects the demand of the other. The quantities demanded, q, and q2, of two products depend on their prices, p, and P2, k as follows: Enter the exact answers. If one manufacturer sells both products, how should the prices be set to generate the maximum possible revenue? What is that maximum possible revenue? P₁ = P2 = H. 9₁ = 9₂ = The maximum revenue is i 280 - 5p₁-3p2 360 - 3p₁ - 5p2.

1. It is 1908 and you are the CEO of Ford Motor Company. General Motors startedproducing cars this year and has quickly become your chief rival. Their recent entrance, as wellas your assembly line methods, allows you the advantage of producing cars faster and choosingyour output levels first. Assume the 1908 inverse demand function for cars is P = 3900 - Q(customers view cars as identical products at this point in time) and production costs are C(qi) =100qi. a. What is Ford’s profit-maximizing output level? GM's?b. What is the market equilibrium price?c. How much profit does each firm earn?d. As the assembly line is used by other firms, the first-mover advantage disappears (fast forward100 years to present day), and more firms have entered the market (e.g. FCA, Tesla, Hyundai,Toyota, Honda, etc.), what do you expect to happen to Ford’s profit (assume demand andcosts are the same)? Explain.e. From 1908 into the 1920s, Ford offered customers one car: the Model T. Further, Henry isfamous…

Use the photo at exercise 14 to solve the problem below  With the Firm Y response function Qy=600-1/2Qx and the Firm XX response function Qx=600-1/2Qy  Imagine that firm X chooses their quantity first, then firm Y observes the quantity of firm X and chooses their own quantity.  What quantities will they end up choosing?  Is there a first or second-mover advantage here?  [You may assume that firm X can only choose quantities that are multiples of 200.  This prevents you from having to deal with prices that are not on the schedule. just a little thinking about how equilibrium works in a sequential-move game.  Oh, and just give me the quantity for each firm, don't worry about giving me a complete strategy for firm Y.]

Imagine that you are the manager of a large clothing company with market power that specializes in selling blue jean pants.  1) Choose two pricing strategies that were discussed in Chapter (Pricing Strategies for Firms with Market Power) that you would implement as the firm manager. 2) Explain how exactly you would implement these two pricing strategies in the real-world

S S The following graph plots the demand curve (blue line) for several consumers in the market for bluetooth speakers in Meade, a small town located in Kansas. The Meade market price of a bluetooth speaker is given by the horizontal black line at $60. Each rectangle you can place on the following graph corresponds to a particular buyer in this market: orange (square symbols) for Andrew, green (triangle symbols) for Beth, purple (diamond symbols) for Darnell, tan (dash symbols) for Eleanor, and blue (circle symbols) for Jacques. Use the rectangles to shade the areas representing consumer surplus for each person who is willing and able to purchase a bluetooth speaker at a market price of $60. (Note: If a person will not purchase a bluetooth speaker at the market price, indicate this by leaving his or her rectangle in its original position on the palette.) PRICE (Dollars per bluetooth speaker) 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 0 Andrew 1 Beth Darnell 2 Eleanor 5 Market Price Jacques 6 3 4…