True or false: The strategy profile where player 1 plays B and player 2 plays C is a Nash equilibrium? Player 1 B O True False A A 4,4 1, 1 C 5,0 Player 2 B 1, 1 1, 1 0,0 C 1, 1 2,2 1, 1

Up ROWENA Straight Down Rowena's Straight dominates Down. Left 2,9 6,4 The game is dominance solvable. 4,3 COLIN Middle The game has a unique Nash equillibrium. 5,5 9,2 Select the incorrect statement about this simultaneous move game. 2,7 Right 6,2 5,3 7,1 The joint payoff, i.e., sum of payoffs, in a Nash equilibrium is not the greatest compared to that in other non equilibrium strategy combinations.

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Consider the game in the table below. What is firm A's payoff from their best response to Firm B choosing Down? Firm A Left Straight Right Up 7,5 3,7 1,3 Firm B Middle 8,14 2,7 4,17 Down 9,13 1,3 2,16 16

• (1,0) (1,1) Player 2 G D H (2,0) Action Player 1 Player 1 Action B Player 1 (3,-1) E Player 2 (0,1) (-1,-1) (a) Find all the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria in this game. (b) Find all the Nash equilibria in this game. (Hint: write the game in strategic form.)

Player 1 Player 2 2 X 4 2 y 1 3 X 2 2 b y O 6 3 1 4 2 X 1 5 y O Consider the game tree given above: a. Write out the set of pure strategies for all players. b. Find the Subgame Nash equilibria of this game.

one two X, 14 three four Firm B Low Firm A Sell High 6, Y Buy Low Let X = 9, Y = 15 and Z=10. This game has 10, Z Firm B High 8,8 Nash equilibrium.

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.      Player 2   Strategy C D E F Player 1 A 9, 8 14, 14 18, 25 12, 19 B 23, 13 10, 18 14, 26 19, 21 a. What is player 1’s optimal strategy?  multiple choice Strategy B Strategy A Player 1 does not have an optimal strategy. b. Determine player 1’s equilibrium payoff.           Prev

Consider the following game. Which one of the following statements is FALSE?    1. There are 7 subgames in this extensive-form game.   2. There are 6 proper subgames in this extensive-form game.   3. (BK, CE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.   4. (BK, DE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

Consider the game given. The top number is player 1’s payoff and the bottom number is player 2’s payoff.a. Find the SPNE.b. Find a Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE.