Consider the game given. The top number is player 1’s payoff and the bottom number is player 2’s payoff. a. Find the SPNE. b. Find a Nash equilibrium that is not an SPNE.

A B 2 2 C 3,2 D 2,1 E 1,1 F In this game, the strategy profile (B.CE) is 4 2.2 not a Nash equilibrium a subgame imperfect Nash equilibrium a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

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The following game is played by 2 players         Adam Jack   Left Middle Right Up 1,2 3,5 2,1 Middle 0,4 2,1 3,0 Down -1,1 4,3 0,2   Determine all dominant strategies for Adam and Jack.  Solve the equilibrium for this game.

Japan's Elpida Memory entered court management and was acquired by Micron. The media reportedthat it was the result of the semiconductor chicken game.￭Question (a) Where is the Nash Equilibrium?￭Question (b) What is the mixed-strategy equilibrium?  – find out x and y￭Question (c) What is the probability of a chicken game?

Player 2 Middle Left P1: $45 P1: $70 Up P2: $45 P2: $50 Player 1 P1: $50 P1: $60 Middle P2: $50 P2: $60 P1: $60 P1: $50 Down P2: $60 P2: $70 In the game shown above, list all of the Nash Equilibrium (please check ALL that apply) (up, left) (up, middle) (up, right) (middle, left) (middle, middle) (middle, right) (down, left) (down, middle) (down, right) No equilibrium Right P1: $45 P2: $60 P1: $50 P2: $70 P1: $60 P2: $60

help please answer in text form with proper workings and explanation for each and every part and steps with concept and introduction no AI no copy paste remember answer must be in proper format with all working

For the game below, find any Nash equilibrium. Show your work and report any Nash equilibrium strategies.

Which one of the following statements is incorrect?   A. Nash equilibrium analysis can be applied to both the Cournot and Bertrand models.   B. In both the Cournot and Bertrand games the players' payoff functions are profit functions.   C. In both the Cournot and Bertrand games the consumers are not explicitly modelled as players.   D. One of the above is incorrect.

Two rival companies competing in the same market need to decide their plans for future expansion of their stores. The Table below shows the possible outcomes of their mutually interdependent actions (payoffs are profits in £m)     Giga Company Titanic Conglomerate   No Change Refurbishment of existing stores Large Expansion No Change     30, 40      25, 35    15, 24 Refurbishment of existing stores     35, 30      28, 32    18, 33 Large Expansion     12, 22     18, 20    20, 25   The Nash equilibrium:            (A)       does not exist. (B)       occurs when both firms choose Refurbishment of existing stores.              (C)       occurs when both firms choose Large Expansion. (D)       occurs when both firms choose No Change.