There are two players, 1 and 2. At the first stage, player 1 chooses whether to play the following simultaneous move game: LR U 2,2 0,0 D 0,0 4,4 If player 1 chooses "play" at the first stage, player 1 and 2 play the above simultaneous move game; If player 1 choose "not play" at the first stage, both players get the payoff of 3. How many SPE does the game have?

3 0: she makes a pront of $9 An is ISK AVCise and aunty she makes. Let P be the probability that it rains the day of the concert. Find the number P tha makes Ann indifferent between organizing the concert in the Club or at the Park. 8. Compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game below: Bungle F2 # Zippy E Left Right DOD F4 Up 2,-1 R I 20 F3 $ BAG 3 4 -2,0 HOT % 5 F5 Down 3,1 T 4,-2 VO MacBook Air 6 F6 Y & 7 F7 * U 8

Consider the following game:                                 Player 2                                  In     Out  Player 1      In     -2,-2    2, 0                      Out    0, 2     0, 0 (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game, or what are the Nash equilibriaof this game? (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)? Which? (c) Suppose Player 1 could move before Player 2 and Player 2 could observe Player 1’s move. What do you think would happen?

Player 1 Player 2 2 X 4 2 y 1 3 X 2 2 b y O 6 3 1 4 2 X 1 5 y O Consider the game tree given above: a. Write out the set of pure strategies for all players. b. Find the Subgame Nash equilibria of this game.